

OUR NAVY
AND
THE NEXT WAR

ROBERT W. NEESER



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OUR NAVY
AND
THE NEXT WAR

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BY
ROBERT WILDEN NEESER

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PREFACE

IF ever the navy of the United States needed the intelligent support of the American people, it is at the present moment. And it is fortunate that interest is now growing, and that a disposition on the part of our citizens to force action toward the meeting of the needs of the service is beginning to show itself.

[On one point there seems to be no difference of opinion—that if we are to have a navy at all, it should be as efficient as it possibly can be made.] We have to-day individual ships that are the admiration of foreign naval architects. We have officers and men on board of them that we believe (hope) are the equal of those in any other service. We have certain materials of war that are as good as those manufactured for other fleets. ? But what we have not appreciated is that efficient individual ships and efficient crews do not alone make a powerful navy. These units must be welded into an efficient whole by an organization and administration which co-ordinate their capabilities and direct their efforts toward a common end.

In building up our navy, the public mind has been centred too much on the power of the single ship. It has taken no account of all the various accessories essential to the maintenance of the fleet.

In a recent article on the British navy, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford said: "We have had no naval war that threatened our existence for over a century. But if such a war had occurred any time in the last forty years preceding the creation of a war staff, our disorganization would have been complete. How in those years the navy ever carried out its duties without a war staff is a marvel; it could only have been done by the superb loyalty of those afloat, who have always done their best and never allowed the word 'impossible' to exist. The Beresford committee of 1909 proved up to the hilt the unreadiness of the fleet if a sudden war had been declared. The creation of a war staff (as a result of the investigation) has removed this danger."

In that same year, 1909, the President of the United States appointed a commission to consider the state of our own navy. The report of that board is strikingly similar to that of the Beresford committee. It revealed a condition that astounded even the service. But it accomplished nothing. For Congress refused to supply the remedy.

Fortunately the superb loyalty of our own officers and men, who "have always done their best and never allowed the word 'impossible' to exist," enabled our ships to carry on their work since then in a way that has, on many occasions, won the praise of foreign experts. In the face of a policy that threatened the very existence of the service, in spite of an unbalanced battle fleet, in spite of a serious shortage in its personnel, in the face of every discouragement, our officers and men have striven, and are still striving, for efficiency. But this goal will not be reached, nor even closely approached, until the doctrine is thoroughly understood that there must be an intelligent comprehension on the part of the government of the purpose for which a navy exists. The people through their representatives—that is, the government—must encourage further the navy's legitimate efforts and fill its unquestioned military needs. They must develop a policy, free from any taint of partisan politics, that will secure the development of the navy in harmony with the purpose for which it exists. They must demand of the navy a policy, for which officers of the navy should be held to strict accountability, and must secure with equal loyalty plans in support of that policy.

Shall we continue to neglect our military needs and withhold that support which alone can supply

the dynamic force that will make of the fleet an efficient instrument capable of fulfilling the purpose for which it exists?

ROBERT W. NEESER.

NEW YORK, March 1, 1915.

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OUR NAVY
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“He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits.”

—BACON.

CHAPTER I

OUR SITUATION

A NATION should develop its physical power for offense or defense in the same way that an individual keeps his body strong and healthy for his daily tasks. The nation is but an elaboration of the individual. Both are governed by the same laws. Each is endowed with spiritual and physical attributes. The development of these is entirely in the hands of the nation or of the individual. A nation that develops its vital attributes but fails to develop its spiritual and physical attributes is in the class with an individual who has grown, through indolence and overfeeding, too obese to defend himself and too dull-witted to avoid his antagonist.

It is strange but nevertheless true that the statesmen of our government have never been able to appreciate the true meaning of Clausewitz's philosophy that: "War is only a continuation, by other means, of national policy." War, by the statesman, must be considered as an instrument of his nation's policy. If we accept the

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truth of this philosophy we are confronted with the conclusion that our statesmen in Washington are directly responsible to the people for the preparedness of its armed forces. The nation's policies are in the keeping of its statesmen. Such policies require, for their continuance, national force, both moral and physical. If the outside pressure against a just policy is strong, a greater national force must be exerted. National force is, in time of peace, diplomatic. Diplomatic notes, ententes, and understandings are the life-giving force behind a policy. When these have failed and the policy is vital to the welfare and progress of the nation, military force takes the place of diplomatic intercourse. Thus it is seen that the nation's policies become the starting-point in all calculations of war strength. The statesman must distinguish between those aims which his nation can abandon and those which are worth fighting for. The statesman must be a man of keen understanding, with a grasp of the fundamentals of history. He must study the history of those nations to which his own nation may, in the course of time, draw near in the field of competition, with danger of collision. Thus it becomes his duty to study the purpose and policy of those nations which may, in the course of their own expansion, challenge his policies, and he must, therefore, understand the

methods that can be employed to assert his own government's purpose.

Unhappily, in America, our statesmen have not reckoned with the necessity of maintaining behind our policies sufficient armed forces to perpetuate them. They seem to believe that if the nations of the world have given their tacit consent to our policies nothing more is necessary. They have been sustained in this method of diplomacy through the increasing acceptance of the principle of arbitration by the people of this nation, notwithstanding the fact that the causes of every one of our own great national struggles were such as to prohibit settlement by any other means than a resort to arms. But when this creation of man's credulity has failed, the nation will come face to face with a condition from which there can be no turning. A policy vigorously challenged by another nation can be settled in two ways only: either by the abandonment of the policy, or else by a war to maintain it. There is no more despicable figure in history than the man who rushes his country into a war for which that nation is unprepared. A true statesman aims to harmonize the national policies with his country's readiness for war. He does not attempt to assert ideals which the armed forces of his country are incapable of defending. Under the moral code the true responsibility of a

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nation is not for the preservation of peace, but for abstention from wrong, and it must be assumed among the civilized nations that each strives to be morally right in its dealings with others. Our national policies are held by the people of the United States to be morally right and necessary to the life and happiness of the people; yet, knowing this, we as a nation refuse to face the unpleasant realization that we may some day be called upon to engage in war in the defense of these policies.

Those who champion the cause of arbitration and universal peace, believing that thereby they may cast off the burden of armaments, by so doing only bring the country they serve nearer to the very thing that they wish most to avoid; and when that hideous monster, War, is at hand, their country lies helpless before the nations that have prepared themselves for the fray. Can any man really believe that such policies as the Monroe Doctrine, the exclusion of Asiatics, and the guarantee of the neutrality of the Panama Canal can be enforced by a court of arbitration?

Yet these three great policies of American diplomacy are our policies of self-defense. They are the paper bulwarks behind which the American nation defends its position and principles in the world of competing nations. Once this barrier is overthrown, the very life of the nation as

an independent and free people may cease to exist. Once the military nations of Europe or Asia have secured a foothold on the American continent, the United States will be forced to join the ranks of the military nations and, through a long, bloody, and exhausting war, hurl from the continent those who have invaded the territories of our assumed overlordship.

In all discussions over armaments in this country nowhere do we hear the voice of the statesmen. Their influence has been directed to the curtailment of our national defenses. How, then, can they acquit themselves before the nation when we are face to face with that final arbiter, war? These statesmen at the head of the government cannot shirk the responsibility for the maintenance of an adequate force to insure victory. A nation of 90,000,000 people, once set in motion against aggression, cannot easily be checked. That the nation is unprepared for war and that defeat is inevitable cannot be forced home after the patriotic fervor of a nation is aroused. The statesman who has forced the issue, regardless of the unpreparedness of his country, may well tremble and endeavor to avert the danger so near at hand; but his puny power is swept aside by the momentum of the outraged nation, and he can only impotently contemplate the unequal struggle for which he alone is to blame.

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The only conclusion to be drawn is that the American nation to-day is sorely in need of statesmen who have studied the problems of our national existence and are able to apply to their solutions organized knowledge, which is the only basis of success in modern life. The nation's welfare must be intrusted to a continuing body of statesmen whom the nation can hold responsible. If we are to remain supreme in our territorial possessions, including the Panama Canal; if we are to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in spite of the cupidity of nations that are now ruthlessly sacrificing hundreds of thousands of their men on the battle-fields of Europe; if we are to exclude the Asiatic from our Pacific coast; if we are to insist upon the open door in China for our trade, then the statesmen of our nation must keep in closer touch with the preparedness for war of the two arms of our national forces. They must stand ready to go before the country and tell the people just which policies can be maintained and which policies must be abandoned. It is the statesmen, and not the military or naval men, who should be using their efforts to increase the power and efficiency of our nation for the coming struggle for the maintenance of our position in the world.

In every civilized country the organization and application of its resources is the basis of success

in war. Resources, when stripped of all collateral elements, reduce down to men, material, and money. The organization of these is wholly within the province of the statesmen.

In Section VIII of the Constitution of the United States the authority is vested in Congress to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and, further, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Who else shall decide upon the size of the army and navy? If the army and navy are inadequate for the purpose of supporting the national policies, whom must the country hold responsible?

In time of war the civilian, as much as the soldier, is responsible for defeat and disaster. Battles are not lost on the field alone; they may be lost beneath the dome of the Capitol; they may be lost in the cabinet; or they may be lost in the private office of the secretary of war or the secretary of the navy. But wherever they may be lost, it is our people who will suffer and our soldiers—patriotic citizens—who will die, with a sudden, bitter knowledge that our military policy is a crime against life, a crime against property, and a crime against liberty.

War affects the life, the liberty, and the property of every individual citizen. Beyond that, it imperils the life of the nation. On its issue

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necessarily depend the fate of governments and the happiness of human beings, present and future. The statesman should, therefore, consider it his duty to study peace and the causes which tend to preserve or destroy peace. History teaches us that peace ends in war. If the causes which terminate peace and produce war cannot be removed, and if the legislator does not recognize and know how to create a powerful army, he ceases to be a statesman.

We thus see that we cannot divorce ourselves from the fact that national preparedness must remain in the keeping of the statesman—that is, the representative of the individual—and that it is the statesman whom the nation must hold responsible for the development of its physical powers. It is idle, nay, useless, to base the size of armies and fleets upon local opinions. These instruments of diplomacy cannot be considered as benefits to a section of the country only. They are national instruments, to be used by the nation for the purpose of maintaining itself a free agent in the world of nations. That the Pacific coast or the Atlantic coast is not adequately prepared to repel an invader is not the care of the local politicians, but of the national statesmen. They must consider, in their demands for military force, the political situation of the entire country and its probable enemies. All decisions which a gov-

ernment is called upon to make are intimately connected, and in the relations between them is to be sought the continuity of design or unity of purpose, which are different names for a policy.

The endeavors of local politicians to deter national preparedness are the outcroppings of self-seeking in the nation. Their influence upon legislation is harmful, and their effect is to drag the national question of national defense into the arena of local party politics.

A nation which becomes so absorbed in money-making pursuits as to neglect to take all those steps which are necessary to secure immunity from attack ceases to impose respect, and so comes to be looked upon as an easy prey. It is only by making costly sacrifices that a nation can earn peace. History shows full well that

“Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.”

Our present lack of preparedness will force us into a slow and irregular transition to a war footing, exposing the country to the dangers of the defensive and the horrors of invasion. The real strength of a definite force depends upon the quality of its soldiers and its officers. [Yet the United States has only one-tenth of one per cent of its men trained for war. It is, therefore, only one-tenth of one per cent strong.]

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In this agitation for naval and military preparedness the country should not make the mistake of laying the blame upon the shoulders of the political party in power. We must remember that the party of opposite beliefs, during a tenure in office of nearly a score of years, during which our military weaknesses were just as evident as they are to-day, often did very little to remedy the defects. It is the duty of the party now in power, after it has seen the besetting dangers of the country's situation, to push remedial legislation. National defense should become a national issue. The party out of power, if it is unpatriotic, will grasp the opportunity of pushing an advantage by declaring that the party in power is failing to provide for the nation's safety, saying nothing of the fact that itself, when in power, was as careless of the national needs. With national defense a party issue, those in power will try to hush things up and prevent a panic. The effect will be, as usual, to defeat the true ends of the nation. The nation should be sufficiently patriotic to agree that national defense is outside of party lines, and both parties should be willing to bring the search-light of public opinion to bear upon the country's needs and stand together to enforce the remedy. National defense is not a political issue; it is a personal issue.

CHAPTER II

OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION

THE United States stands to-day as the great arbiter of the western hemisphere. It has expanded, by conquest and purchase, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Its northern border touches the frontier of Canada, its southern boundary is washed by the waters of the Rio Grande. Conquest has carried the American symbol of sovereignty into the waters of the Pacific to the very gateway of China. The Caribbean, once the spoil of European nations, now may be said to be almost Americanized by our acquisition of Puerto Rico, by our virtual political domination of these islands still under the rule of tropical races, and by our possession of the Canal route across the Isthmus of Panama, through which will soon pass the commerce of the world.

We have, in our hands, the making of a great empire—not an empire of kings, but an empire in whose womb lies the seed of the nation's fundamental beliefs, recorded with such clearness in the Declaration of Independence. The power is

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ours, if we are men enough to grasp it, to give to the great world over which our policies have flung their protecting arm those principles of social life to us now fundamental: "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The individual has no right to regard the state as a means for attaining his own ambitions. The nation owes a duty to posterity which can be performed only through the self-sacrifice of the nation to-day. The territories over which flies the American flag, and those territories over which our institutions have spread their protecting wing, are a legacy from the past. They were handed down to us, not to fritter away, but to develop and conserve.

With the avowed object of safeguarding these principles of government to those over whom our nation has assumed the guardianship, we have laid down certain policies which other nations are called upon to respect. The most important of these is contained in the message which President Monroe sent Congress in 1823, in which he said: "We owe it to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and

those European powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

When we contemplate the great struggle of blood which is now going on in Europe, a struggle for survival, a struggle for domination, a struggle for conquest, where the wealth of entire nations is risked, can we still adhere to the belief that the mailed fist of some of those nations will not be stretched across the seas to grasp the vast resources, as yet untouched, in the countries to the south of us, from the Rio Grande to Terra del Fuego?

The limited boundaries of Europe have become too narrow to confine the people of strong and vigorous nations seeking expansion. Already those nations have peacefully penetrated into Mexico and Central and South America. Some of these nations have enunciated the principle that it is the duty of a state to make war to advance its own ideals and its own civilization. Upon the completion of this world war Europe will be even more of an armed camp. The devastation of war will have reduced the resources within their own borders. The rich countries beyond the seas, basking under the sunshine of peace, will offer them alluring inducements to sweep away that doctrine which has been so long distasteful.

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Whether this happens or not will depend only upon our power to prevent it. That power will rest with our naval and military forces. If they are weak and incapable of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, then that doctrine will pass into the unknown. The integrity and neutrality of the Panama Canal will, of necessity, suffer the same fate as the Monroe Doctrine, and, unless we are prepared to defend our position in the world, we shall all see the day when the fruits of American labor, enterprise, and ingenuity will be controlled and administered by a foreign nation. Our colonial possessions and our control over the weak republics of the Caribbean will pass from us because we shall have demonstrated our unfitness to control their destinies. Our trade with the Orient, even that with South America, will be paralyzed through hostile tariffs. Our own shores may feel the iron tread of the invader, and our cities may suffer destruction.

It is a misconception entirely unsupported by history that nations, at the end of a great war, are exhausted. We have only to look to the condition of Germany after her war with France in 1870 and to the military strength of the United States after the four long years of the Civil War. In 1865 the United States had a trained army of a million men. Those men were warriors with fighting blood in their veins. Their love of coun-

try was high above the mere lust for gold. We had great men and tried leaders—men trained on the battle-field.

But wherein lie our dangers, and how can they be met? The nearest and most important danger is in the Pacific. By our own hand we freed Japan from the isolation of centuries of seclusion into a nation fully armed and equipped with that military spirit of which we, as a nation, are so lacking. The rapid assimilation of Western ideas and the successful appropriation of all the material elements of our Christian civilization by that island empire have astounded the world. Within the last decade Japan has emerged conqueror from the struggle of two modern wars.

The growth of the Japanese naval power must cause us to look to the efficiency of our navy, for the interests of Japan and those of the United States are, in some quarters, diametrically opposed. Japan, at first friendly, has suddenly changed her attitude in the tone of her diplomatic intercourse to one not as amicable. Nations are no more mindful of past favors than are individuals. Friendship between nations cannot always stand the strain of a conflict of interests.

A peaceful conquest of China, and the domination of its markets is apparently Japan's aim—peaceful if possible, but by force if necessary. During the present war Japan has seized the

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islands that belonged to Germany, lying at the door of our own islands in the Pacific. These new possessions of Japan threaten, if they do not sever, the lines of communication to our own colonies. The occupation of Kiauchau by Japan is only another step in that domination of China which the Japanese statesmen have long intended.¹

An antipathy between races is not itself a cause of war. The true causes of war between nations have their roots in trade rivalry and in the necessity for an expansion of territory for the surplus population of a vigorous race; yet race antipathy in the Pacific contains germs of possible danger. The exclusion of Japanese from our country might be used by Japan as a *casus belli*. However, the underlying cause of a war between the United States and Japan would not be for the settlement of such a trivial matter. The true reason would be to enforce the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" and cause the United States to evacuate her commanding positions in the Pacific. The Japanese question may be definitely settled by liberating the Philippines and Guam and retiring from the Orient; but in the event of such an ac-

¹ It is interesting to note that Japan's ultimatum to the Germans at Kiauchau was the identical one which the Germans had presented to the Japanese after the latter had won Port Arthur from the Chinese. Thus does the Oriental know how to bide his time.

tion the United States must also give up its naval bases in those islands.¹

There are now only two great powers that can enter into a war for the supremacy of the Pacific; they are the United States and Japan. Japan's advantage in such a struggle is mainly due to the fact that her entire empire is not only on that ocean, but in the strategic centre of its western border.

Until the day when Japan has succeeded in closing the ports of China to the commerce of all other countries by hostile tariffs, our commerce will seek to compete for its share in the trade of the Flowery Kingdom. That trade, once large, is dwindling year by year. American goods are being forced out of the Chinese market by similar articles manufactured more cheaply in Japan. To regain that trade is impossible unless greater aid is given by our government. No country can ever win the trade of the Orient that does not make it a national concern.

As long as Japan is engaged in a commercial penetration of China she may not yet divert her attention to a further development of the islands lying south of her. Japan, like Germany, is dominated by the military spirit, which accepts

¹ So far as the Philippines are concerned, we must either abandon them or else provide ample means for their defense. There is no *tertium quid*.

as fundamental the biological necessity of war and the duty of self-assertion. Such a nation of warriors will not hesitate to follow through its carefully worked-out plan of national expansion, even though it encounters a nation of double the population and treble the resources. Within the last few years the contact with Western civilization has had a marked effect upon the Japanese people. Their character is undergoing a change. They are losing their military spirit and becoming more wedded to commercialism. This fact has been deplored by their statesmen, who were born and trained under the precepts of Bushido, "the soul of Japan."

Thus we see that in owning islands at her very doors there will be many points of possible contact with this military nation of the Pacific. It, therefore, becomes our duty to prepare our armed forces in the event that we may be called upon to use them, not for aggressive action, but to maintain our dignity in the Orient.

In the Atlantic our Monroe Doctrine has ever been distasteful to Germany. For years she has been colonizing Brazil until now she has there a population of over a million Germans. Whoever is the victor in the present war in Europe, the spirit of the German nation cannot long remain subdued. Even if defeated, it will rise up stronger than ever, with its convictions as solidly implanted

as before the war. Germany is one of the world's greatest manufacturing peoples. She requires colonies to supply the raw materials and food-stuffs needed in the Vaterland and colonies wherein to open a field of activity for the immense intellectual labor forces now lying unproductive in Germany. Furthermore, Germany requires, for the protection of her trade, a base in the Caribbean. She has already entered into negotiations with several of the minor independent governments bordering on that sea for the acquisition of such harbors for commercial purposes. Will not the occupation of such harbors, even for commercial reasons, be considered by the United States as a step toward a more general occupation later on, and would it not be resisted?

If Germany should be victorious in the struggle in Europe, which is not beyond the realms of possibility—if Germany were to wrest the command of the sea from England—then our statesmen will have to consider the question of the application and limits of the Monroe Doctrine. If we are willing to engage in a war with Germany, which would probably be a naval war, at least at first, it is doubtful whether we could protect our interests in the Caribbean and in South America. The movement of a fleet across the Atlantic would not be a difficult task for her. It is one that the German general staff has already worked

out to the minutest detail. She would have all those difficulties of long lines of communication for the transportation of supplies from her home bases to her fleet that the United States would have if it attempted to move its fleet for hostile purposes across the Pacific; but those are difficulties that German national efficiency, as reflected in her army and navy, can much more easily overcome.

While we should be engaged with Germany in the Atlantic, Japan, no longer under the influence of English politics, could work her will in the Pacific. All our island possessions would fall before her forces. America would be driven in behind her own original borders.

The United States has long enjoyed immunity from the interference of Europe and Asia in its political affairs. This immunity has been due largely to the policy of Great Britain. Through the powerful sentiment of the blood-tie between England and the United States the former has been able to further its purposes on the American continent without seriously alienating the friendship of the great republic. As long as England was able to thwart Germany in her colonization schemes she was content to tolerate the rivalry of America and willingly granted her moral support to our Monroe Doctrine, while through her alliance with Japan she held the control over that

country's aspirations in the Pacific. With such a champion as England, our thoughts have naturally been turned away from the possible dangers to our interests in case the equilibrium of forces in the world should become disturbed. We have, in fact, reasoned, as a matter of course, that this equilibrium would always be maintained and that the United States would never be required to exert any effort to this end. This idea, to the American nation, has become an obsession. But the equilibrium is now about to be disturbed. The present struggle in Europe cannot bring about any other result. Either Germany will emerge vanquished or England will surrender the command of the sea to Germany. Whichever happens, it matters not which, the time has now arrived for the people of the United States to awaken and realize the besetting dangers surrounding them.

Let us stop and consider the characteristics and attributes of this military power in the Pacific. Japanese militarism is, perhaps, difficult to separate from patriotism. One is simply the expression of the other. The organized strength and patriotism of Japan is her defense. Every Japanese considers it a privilege rather than a mere duty to serve in the army. Under her efficient form of government the strength and efficiency of the army and navy have kept pace

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with the nation's commercial and industrial progress. The well-ordered organizations of her government and of her military services are fundamentally sound. No conflicting lines of authority or responsibility are permitted to exist. Therefore the greatest efficiency has been realized with the money appropriated. Her military and naval development has been guided by military statesmen and executed by military and naval men. The size and power of her army and navy is based upon a definite national policy. In efficiency and strength both military services have thus far remained outside of politics. High command has gone to those who have demonstrated their ability in active service in war and peace. Such well-ordered methods have given to the personnel the precious qualities so vital to successful cohesion. The Japanese nation is united. Her navy has been trained in the school of war. Her position in the Pacific and her instant preparedness give her the advantage of initiative. She owns no outlying possessions which might, if captured by us, seriously affect the issue, while we have many such possessions lying defenseless within her sphere of operations. Her large and well-organized army can be utilized to occupy as many of our possessions as she will deem advisable in order to deny them to our fleet. With all possible available bases in the hands of the Japanese, our

fleet will have no base near enough to the Japanese coast from which it could operate in order to control the seas in that area. Yet it is only by controlling the seas that we can hope to succeed in a war with Japan.

In the event of hostilities in the far East, then, the first decision that will have to be made by our statesmen will be: How shall we bring the war to a successful conclusion? Hawaii will be our only remaining island possession in the Pacific. With the fleet at Hawaii, and with Japan controlling the waters of the far East how shall we operate to bring her to terms? This is a question that would have to be decided by our naval general staff, if one existed.

A study of the history of the conflicts in which great nations have engaged reveals two underlying causes of war: one is the control of commerce; the other is the possession of the sources of those two great industrial necessities—metal and fuel. But the prime factor involved in the evolution of a navy is the protection of trade, for the safeguarding of which the laws of nations should be framed so as to give every confidence to those embarking on commercial ventures across the seas. In other words, a government should protect its commerce as if it were its own enterprise. In ancient times commerce was exposed to great risks, subject to constant pillage, and hunted down in

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peace as well as in war. Nations, therefore, appreciated the necessity of protecting their merchantmen, and commerce became an armed force in the world. Even the purely commercial states became armed powers for the protection of their trade routes.

But, curiously enough, the great political empires of the world formerly imperfectly developed their own industries and had little sympathy with any means of prosperity from without. Their sole aim was either to absorb under their own powerful sceptre or else to destroy whatever was rich or great beyond their borders. Nothing is more marked in the early history of the world than this struggle of commerce to obtain security.

The strength of Rome lay in her legions; that of Carthage in her ships. Carthage became the greatest power in the Mediterranean and inherited the trade of her Phoenician ancestors, and also the trade of Egypt, Greece, and Asia Minor. But antagonism between the great military non-commercial power of Rome and the great military commercial power of Carthage, whose interests crossed at so many points, caused the downfall of Carthage and her destruction. At the same time Rome accomplished the destruction of another great trade centre of which she was jealous, Corinth. Palmyra likewise fell half a century after the spoliation of Athens. And this policy

of Rome, of wiping out all the outlying centres of trade, eventually caused her own downfall, because it hampered her own power to hold or turn to profitable account these valuable conquests.

Rome never became a great trade centre, although the city grew to great size and required immense imports of food to support its population. These imports came in the nature of taxes. For Rome neither supplied exports nor built up a carrying trade. Her contribution to civilization was her organization and her administration. Her service to humanity was, therefore, political and non-economic in character. In the arts and in diplomacy her citizens excelled, and through their skill in these they succeeded in living on the labor of subject people. The "*Pax Romana*" was the commodity which Rome exchanged for these contributions.

By many the analogy between England and Rome is considered noteworthy. England is the Rome of to-day, but, unlike Rome, she herself is a great maritime nation—a military one on the seas. Her geographical position was believed by her statesmen not to require a great army. England spread her civilization over the other continents, as did Rome. England has organized the world's commerce and by so doing has given enormous impulses to the manufacturing indus-

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tries. But a nation, having fulfilled its mission in civilization and reached the zenith of its power, will decline. This is the law of nature. Germany and the United States, and possibly Japan, are the modern Carthage, Athens, and Venice. Therefore, if England is to remain predominant these commercial powers must be controlled. Even now England employs in her industrial life many Germans and Americans, because they are more efficient, reliable, and painstaking than Englishmen. And for the maintenance of her enormous commerce England, to-day, is indebted to the volume of American and German trade.

The rapid rise of the economic power of Germany has shaken England's faith in her own predominance. She fears the loss of her naval supremacy and of her control over the commerce of the world. Her policy has been to restrict Germany's colonial expansion, for she fears the rivalry of a more efficient race. Yet her fear of Germany is not half so great as her fear of America. Her statesmen see the importance of first settling with Germany before the United States waxes stronger. Once the German fleet has been annihilated, then the suppression of potential American ambitions will be immeasurably easier. So long as the German fleet is a force to be reckoned with, England dare not show her cloven hoof to the United States. Great Britain

must sacrifice every consideration for the maintenance of her naval supremacy.

In 1860 the United States owned 5,000,000 tons of shipping, England only 4,000,000. The United States at the outbreak of the Civil War was in a position to control the carrying trade of the world. The action of England in supporting the Confederacy and desiring their independence was logical and necessary were she to remain the mistress of the sea. Much of the shipping of the United States was destroyed by war-ships fitted out by the Confederates in English ports; and when the Civil War was over, England's carrying trade totalled 6,000,000 tons, while that of the United States amounted to only 4,000,000, and was rapidly on the decline.

In 1873 England owned 43 per cent of the merchant carrying trade of the world. The United States owned 14 per cent, and Germany 6 per cent. In 1914 England owned 53 per cent, the United States 9 per cent, and Germany 13 per cent. England's vital interest in the rebating of tolls to our coastwise shipping through the Canal is evident to all students of her commercial history. Even without rebating, the ship-building industry in the United States will increase. There will, therefore, be a cut in England's carrying trade, for some of our trade that is now carried in English bottoms will be carried under our own

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flag. With the United States and Germany cutting into her 53 per cent, England fears she will lose her advantage.

We have seen wherein lie possible points of contact between the United States and the three great military nations that are each determined to secure its proportion of the world's commerce, and more than its proportion if possible. [Between these four nations—England, Germany, Japan, and the United States—the bulk of the commerce of the world is divided. Where is the power capable of limiting the share of each? There is but one power capable of accomplishing this. That is the power of diplomacy backed by force, or, in other words, the power of national efficiency.]

It is not too much to believe that in the struggle for commercial supremacy England will use every tool within her power to maintain her position. It is not too much to believe that England, sometime in the near future, may employ the military power of her ally—Japan—for the purpose of eliminating one of her competitors. We have reason to believe that, thus far, England has protected us from the military aggression of Japan. There is a report that in 1907 the Japanese military party had actually ordered operations against the United States—which contemplated nothing less than the occupation of the Philippine Islands.

It has been said that troops were already on board the transports, and that these vessels were loaded and ready to sail at a moment's notice. England's veto alone stopped this movement. She was not ready to see America involved in a struggle with her ally, for America's trade was still carried in British bottoms. How will she act after our merchant flag again covers the seas?

America is too prone to confound military *resources* with military *strength*. Military resources comprise the wealth of the nation, the number of able-bodied men of military age, and the number of ships available for war. Military strength, on the other hand, is measured by the number of *trained* soldiers properly organized and equipped that may be brought to a given point at a given time, and the number of war-ships fully manned and *trained* that can be quickly concentrated for the purpose of meeting the enemy's fleet. Let us remember that in 1900 China had a population estimated at over 400,000,000. Yet her military strength was so inadequate that she was unable to prevent 15,000 foreign troops of Europe, Asia, and America from marching ninety miles inland, capturing her capital, and dictating terms of peace humiliating to every inhabitant of the Middle Kingdom from within the very walls of her Forbidden City.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION

IT is easily within the reach of every citizen to discover the failure of our military policy. Our military writers have eloquently condemned it. General Washington, in his correspondence, dispassionately set forth its evils.

It is unfortunately the popular impression that our people acquitted themselves creditably as a nation during the war of the Revolution, and it comes as a shock to know that such was not the case. Even with our country fanned to flame by the invasion by British troops it was difficult, almost impossible, for us to raise men to repel the enemy. Fortunately there were plenty of trained officers who volunteered their swords, and these were influential enough in their communities to enroll volunteers. In the first skirmishes of the war, notably at Bunker Hill, such veterans as Prescott, Putnam, Stark, and Knowlton were a strong factor in the behavior of the minutemen. But there were many occasions when, even when commanded by experienced leaders, our militia acquitted themselves none too well.

At this time the nation was a loosely knit confederation, an assemblage of small nations, each sufficient unto itself and jealous of all the rest. Congress called upon the colonies to furnish troops. Those that did not feel the effects of the war in some cases refused to obey; the others grudgingly sent men, but far less than the numbers needed. The necessity of a force owing allegiance to the United States exclusively, consequently became imperative, and Congress fortunately heeded the timely advice and ordered the raising of Continental troops in certain States near the points of invasion. It was a small beginning, but this handful of regularly enlisted troops formed the nucleus of the army which finally won us our independence.

Washington, who had the power of appointing officers, at times was greatly discouraged at the unpatriotic attitude of those who sent in their names. Companies enlisted in one State refused to serve under officers from another State. "Many of the officers," he wrote, "sent in their names to serve in expectation of promotion; others stood aloof to see what advantage they could make for themselves, while a number who had declined have again sent in their names to serve. So great has the confusion arising from these and many other perplexing circumstances been, that I found it absolutely impossible to fix

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this very interesting business exactly on the plan resolved on in the conference. The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, indeed more so, if possible, than with the officers. They will not enlist unless they know their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, so that it was necessary to fix the officers the first thing, which is, at last, in some manner done, and I have given out enlisting orders."

So discouraged was Washington at the failure of his countrymen that he later added: "There must be some other stimulus besides love of country, to make men fond of the service. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this (Massachusetts) colony. Our situation is truly alarming."

Again, in a private letter to a friend he unburdens his heart more completely. "Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of military arrangement I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to again."

But there were so many desertions that it was almost impossible for Washington and his officers to hold the men. Any system of voluntary enlistment necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits. And that system has been found necessary in almost all of our military operations.

If we read the true military history of our country, and not the highly colored accounts written for the school-reading of our children, we shall learn some startling facts of the disastrous effects of our past military policy. We shall find out that at no time during the Revolutionary War did we have sufficient dependable troops. After five years' experience, Washington, in a letter to Congress, expressed his opinion of our policy in these words: "Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the

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ordinary guards, liable at any moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterward of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to the victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause."

Such were Washington's thoughts on our mili-

tary policy; on the value of raw recruits; on the value of undisciplined men; on the value of the patriotism of our people. Since then has that value increased? Has it not, on the contrary, lessened? Even with our vast numbers, are we not worse off to-day because we shall have pitted against us a military force increased in like proportions to our great increase in population? Our small army cannot furnish a sufficient nucleus of trained troops. The great disorganization and inexperience so eloquently condemned by Washington will be magnified many times to-day, for the fibre of the nation has degenerated since the days of '76.

A truly dispassionate investigation of our other foreign wars, and of our Civil War, will disclose almost identical defects in policy. Tracing nearly all of our sacrifices to the want of a military system in our Civil War, and the abortive strategy of the War Department, General Upton laid down the axiom: "that a nation which goes to war unprepared educates its statesmen at more expense than its soldiers." The strategy of the Civil War was decided by civilians who feared the power of a dictator, not realizing that, while armies are created by war, dictators are born only of disaster. Washington was not made a dictator until disaster overtook us. Yet this fear of a dictator induced us, during the Civil War, to dispense with our general-in-chief after our armies had been disci-

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plined and drilled ready for battle, with the result that the conflict was prolonged for four years through defective strategy, the blame for which we must ascribe to the system of government, which, in every war since the adoption of the Constitution and during the intervals of peace, has permitted a civil officer below the President to override our military leaders and bring to naught their wisdom and counsel.

Is it not time that we recognize the moral duty of the State to train as many of its citizens as possible in the use of arms? Such training is not only in preparation for war but also in order that each individual may be benefited by a certain amount of military service which unquestionably improves his physical and moral stamina. It is far wiser yearly to spend sufficient funds for purposes of defense than to waste vast sums of money in futile attempts, at the last moment, to avoid a peril that has been disregarded during a generation of fundamental blunders.

Military qualities are not second nature. As a nation the American people shun military service. The occupations of peace are more pleasing and less exacting than the duties of a soldier. The individual looks upon military service as one in which his individualism will be stifled. His intellect resists such repression. But military training, on the contrary, has the opposite effect.

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For it reveals to the recruit the true plane of the nation's welfare, which is materially higher than that of the individual himself. If this could only be recognized by our people, the American soldier's calling would be better understood and the uniform of the government's defenders would become to him a badge of honor rather than, what some consider it now, a livery of shame.

Furthermore, our military system must be developed. War is the means of obtaining political ends and of supporting the moral strength of a nation when those ends are contested by rival powers. Without the means of waging war the nation's moral strength rapidly degenerates. [A large standing army is not essential if the citizens of the country are trained in the use of arms. All that is required is a workable military system by which we can concentrate at the point of attack a sufficiently trained force to repel an invader.]

Our permanent coast defenses are of no value against the attacks of a military nation unless we have sufficient trained men and modern arms to protect them. For the defense of every harbor of importance on both our Pacific and Atlantic coasts Congress has provided land forts. These fortifications can prevent an enemy only from landing on our shores within the range of the fortifications' guns. Their guns deny to the enemy the facilities of a commodious harbor for

disembarking his troops until those guns have been silenced and captured. But recent wars have demonstrated that efficient military nations can disembark large armies even in localities where harbor facilities are not available. The United States, during the campaign of Santiago, when that harbor was denied us by Spanish guns, landed 15,000 soldiers on the open coast without a single casualty. A more military nation than ourselves can readily disembark several hundred thousand men beyond the range of our forts' guns and, if we lack a mobile army of trained men, can attack our big guns from the rear and in an incredibly short time reduce our fortifications and obtain command of our harbors for their own use. Expensive fortifications, unguarded by a mobile army are, therefore, in the light of the lessons of Liége and Maubeuge, a waste of the nation's money.

A military nation such as Germany or Japan can, once our fleet has been destroyed or blockaded in port, throw a trained army upon our coast-line within two weeks of the commencement of hostilities. Even if it were possible to know the point of landing, and we had the time to concentrate our entire regular force at that point, it would not be large enough or sufficiently equipped to stop the invader. The militia and State troops would be of no value to us until they had been

trained as soldiers. This would require many months. [Great Britain is now suffering the pangs of remorse over her military unpreparedness. Millions of men are to-day being trained in England. If these men could have been despatched to the Continental battle-field in the first week of hostilities, the decisive battle of the war would have been fought long since, and successfully for England! But the very men who should have been trained during peace in the use of arms arrived on the firing-line too late.]

To-day the United States is justified in devoting most of its energies to the increase of its naval power, for its fleet is now, as it was in 1812 and in 1898, the nation's first line of defense. But with our fleet weaker than our probable antagonist's, should not our second line of defense be maintained at double strength? That second line comprises our land fortifications and our mobile army. We all understand the value of boundary fortifications. In following the great war in Europe, we have seen what great towers of strength they are when used legitimately to rest the flanks of an army. The incalculable value of the fortifications of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort is apparent. Between these fortifications the allied armies have been drawn up. The mobile army has saved the fortifications from destruction, while the fortifications have supported

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the most vulnerable points of attack. Forts and mobile armies are supplementary. Each is necessary to the other. In the same way, on our sea frontiers our armies must rest their flanks upon the fortifications which the enemy is bent upon capturing. The army protects that part of the fortifications in the rear beyond the arc of fire of the fort guns. The army drives back the enemy and holds it at such a distance that it cannot use heavy siege-guns for the reduction of the forts.

If, after the close of the present European conflict, a great military nation should emerge victorious and the policies of the victor conflicted with the policies of this republic, and if that nation invoked a war for the purpose of a settlement, on obtaining control of the seas, that nation could land, in the vicinity of New York, an army which, in two weeks or even less, would destroy our fortifications and hold the city and its millions of citizens at its mercy. It is idle for us even to consider that our defense would be an insurmountable obstacle to such a feat. Our raw reserves, supported by the entire regular army, could not make a "war machine" hesitate a single moment in its stride. Like clockwork it would advance from its landing-place, sweeping away our puny opposition until its object was firmly within its grasp. The destruction of property entailed would amount to hundreds of millions,

and the indemnity levied would cripple the nation for years to come. The cost of a navy to make such a *débâcle* impossible is a mere pittance compared to the great financial loss which would result from a catastrophe such as this.

The loss to the country through indemnity, through loss by destruction, and loss by dislocation would amount to a figure beyond our comprehension. In 1871 Germany exacted an indemnity from France of \$1,000,000,000—an amount sufficient to build fifty dreadnaughts. The loss by destruction from such a campaign in a populous locality like New York would amount in addition to even more than the indemnity paid by France. And the loss in trade and commerce (for from the day the invader's foot sullied our shores all business would stop) would amount to additional hundreds of millions.

No military man of intelligence can refute the possibility of such a disaster. And this would be only part of the nation's losses. All of our coast cities could be as easily reduced, laid waste, or placed under tribute. Let us remember how, in 1814, the city of Washington was burned by a handful of British troops. All the patriotism of our colonial ancestors did not suffice to arrest the march of a few thousand regular British soldiers. Patriotism is a military asset only when it produces trained soldiers for the nation's defense.

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Knowing all this, we naturally ask ourselves what defect in our system permits us to remain so vulnerable. The answer is known already to every military student. It is the lack of sound military policy. The statesmen must hearken to the voice of the country's military experts. The statesmen must be prevented from frittering away the legacy which our ancestors have handed down to us. They must put away the confusions that waste human possibilities. Good intentions do not constitute a strong government, nor do they produce an efficient nation. The noblest sentiments can never supply the want of soldiers. We must, each one of us, urge our statesmen to study the problems of national existence, and apply to their solution the organized knowledge of the military experts, which can be the only basis of success to the nation. The statesmen must recognize, in their diplomacy, the real strength of the military and naval arm of the nation.

Universal military service in some form is the only way of saving the country from itself. In America the idea of patriotism is new, and has been shaken by the constant introduction of foreign blood. This introduction of new blood is dangerous for countries which are not sufficiently strong to absorb it. The teaching of patriotism should be one of the fundamental points which the educators should insist upon the most. The

educators, especially those who teach the child, must always remember that it is patriotism that must dominate in order to inspire in the child a great admiration for his own country. We must insist that the teachers of our children do not expound doctrines harmful to the nation. A teacher is free to be a peace man, an antimilitarist, or an antipatriot if he chooses, but at school he must be silent upon these subjects. If he refuses to be silent, he should be at once removed. The effect upon the masses of those who harp upon antimilitarism and antipatriotism is almost as disastrous to the nation as its effect upon the growing child. This Utopian dream of a world confederation and the banishment of national competition and war addresses itself to the instinctive reflexes of a man or woman, to the spirit of self-preservation not of the nation but of the individual. The proletariat, until it has been taught, cannot conceive of such an indefinite entity as a nation. If our teachers are allowed to instruct our children that defeat is of small interest to their future, and that to fight is not good for them personally, then they will no longer fight when the national safety is menaced. Those who teach the masses that the good of the individual is higher than the good of the nation teach a lesson of cowardice that introduces egotism. A nation can live only if its citizens possess ideas

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in common, and the idea of patriotism is the most powerful one for cementing a people together. Militarism may be a relative evil. In its extreme it is dangerous and ruinous to resources, but there would be a still greater danger to the soul of the people if we attempted to repress patriotism. The police are very costly to maintain, yet no one talks of dispensing with them.

Probably nothing at this moment is more dangerous to the future of America than the many speeches that are made by never-fight philanthropists upon disarmament and universal peace. If we followed their advice our patriotism would be entirely destroyed. We should be left at the mercy of adversaries who have not disarmed. Let us rather wait before disarming until we know that we have no enemies in the world.

Universal military training should have as its aim the development of moral qualities in the individual—such qualities as attention, reflection, judgment, and initiative. How seldom we find these qualities among our masses and yet how frequently they are encountered among those who, whatever their origin, have been trained as soldiers or sailors! There are other qualities which military training can produce, the most important of which are submission to discipline, a spirit of solidarity, perseverance against difficulties, and a will to succeed. These qualities cannot be acquired

from books, but only from experience, and their development results only from their exercise. We obey the laws of the community because the strong arm of justice compels us to. As a nation we can do right only when the habit of doing right and avoiding wrong has been learned by the nation and becomes a subconscious act. By training the individual, by making him subconsciously choose the right, the nation composed of individuals will subconsciously act according to the principles of righteousness. Military training will teach the individual to govern himself and have a respect for duty. This military training for the defense of the nation will create sentiments in common and, above all, an ideal in common. Moral rules will be appreciated and admitted to be fundamental. A nation cannot build its hopes on reason. "Human reason has only served to build fragile edifices which fall in ruins before they are finished. It has built nothing solid, but has shaken everything. People who have trusted in reason believe no longer in their gods, in their traditions, or in their principles. They believe, to no greater extent, in their chiefs, and they overturn them as soon as they have acclaimed them. Not possessing in any degree the direction of possibilities and realities, they live more and more in the unfeasible and the unreal, following continually delusive chimeras." How

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strikingly this reminds us of our times! Popular heroes scarcely rise in prominence before they are overthrown.

Of necessity, the ideal in whose defense a nation should exert itself is always a child of tradition and never the offspring of will. An ideal cannot be created by human will, and we must accept it without argument. The idea of "country" cannot be created by our wills, and we must accept it without argument. This idea of "country" represents, with us, a heritage of sentiments, of traditions, of thoughts, of common interests. To cherish and defend this idea must be learned in our childhood. It is this idea in a nation that makes it strong, vigorous, progressive. Lacking this idea makes it weak, spineless, and leads to its destruction.

The general indifference of our people toward national defense, the size and effectiveness of their army and navy, is the result of a blind confidence in fate, which the faulty training in the schools fosters. If the children of the nation could know that in every war in which the country has engaged our untrained soldiers broke and ran at almost the first shot, while our trained soldiers challenged the admiration of the world by their steadfast courage; if the children could be told that our wars have been enormously protracted by the lack of sufficient trained forces in the be-

ginning to take the initiative; if it could be impressed upon them that hundreds of thousands of our women were made widows, and children orphans, and that millions of men were crippled for life because they were sent to the battle-fields unprepared, knowing nothing of what awaited them there, with officers as ignorant and incompetent in military duties as the soldiers themselves; if our children could be shown that \$1,000,000 in preparation before any of our wars would have saved \$50,000,000 later—if all this could be done, then indifference to the nation's safety would immediately cease.

Where is the historian who will write the real history of our past and point out to our children the lessons so bitterly forgotten by this nation? Who will tell them that the superb isolation which was once our protection is no more; that in these days of great fleets of swift merchantmen an army can be moved by sea even faster than by land, and that we owe our immunity from attack not to the enemy's fear of our latent strength but to the international jealousies and mutual distrust of those nations that desire to challenge our commercial supremacy and our political control over the American continent? Who will tell our children that, despite arbitration treaties and treaties to gain time, some day, not far in the future, that challenge will come? The uni-

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versal law must be obeyed. Already Europe and Asia are hungry. If we are to maintain our position in the world and acquit ourselves with honor, it cannot be done by written peace doctrines or by training one-half of one per cent of our people to oppose millions of trained soldiers. Who, in the most forcible language that can be written, will tell our children to pluck from their hearts that deep-seated belief that somehow we could beat off any force that could be thrown against us? This faulty tradition held to so doggedly by the American nation will be its undoing if it be not eradicated from our national thought.

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION

MODERN history has shown us the necessity for the instant preparedness not only of our land forces but also of our navy. How rapidly in these days of rapid transportation and of quick information a nation is hurried from the blessings of peace to the horrors of war the experience of the last few years has brought home. A nation is given no time to collect its fleet, to repair it, to dock its ships, to call in its reserves (if it has any), to fill up the complements of the personnel.¹ Time spent in placing in commission reserve ships is time lost. The opportunity for target practice and training is past. Even the time required to collect the necessary auxiliary

¹ "We have no reserve and never have had one," the secretary of the navy recently wrote to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, in urging a small appropriation to perfect the organization of one. "We are turning out every year into civil life 3,000 to 4,000 highly trained men, who, if organized, would be ready on short notice to man our battleships, armored cruisers, and other naval vessels in reserve, and supplement the crews of the battleships of the fleet in case of war. No nation keeps in regular service in time of peace sufficient men to man all its fighting vessels, but there is none that

vessels, which our fleet now lacks, may not be given by a ready opponent. All these are peace preparations that should be attended to in advance of the declaration of war. The fleet is an instrument that should always be ready. Its plans of campaign should be prepared and known to those of its officers upon whom the responsibility of success or failure in time of emergency rests. Its administration during peace is not, therefore, a civil concern but a military one. The disposition of the ships, their training, the times for their repairs and docking, or, more comprehensively, the entire work of the fleet should, in consequence, be outlined and decided by the naval officers who will be called upon to fight it.

From the beginning, one hundred and forty years ago, the navy has been the willing and faithful subordinate of the civil power and the indispensable instrument of the American people for carrying into effect their national policy as expressed by their chosen representatives in Con-

gress. It does not provide for a trained reserve. The enlisted men of the navy have been for years urging upon Congress and the department the passage of legislation which will permit of their retirement upon graded rates of pay for certain periods of service. This measure will accomplish what they want and at the same time give the country a claim on their services as well as provide for the much-needed reserve."

This recommendation, most fortunately, was favorably acted upon by Congress only a few days ago.

gress. That control of national policy lies in the hands of our statesmen. The fleet, with its ships and its bases, is the means to the end. Once the statesmen have invoked war to continue the policy of the government, they call upon the military to act. From that time forward an instrument is called into the service of diplomacy which requires knowledge outside of the statesman's art. Its mastery requires a life study. The statesmen indicate the end to be attained—that is a function of the State—but the method of using that force to accomplish the end requires expert knowledge beyond the knowledge of the statesman. The statesmen continue to control the course of the war in so far as its development affects the nation's policies with the enemy or with other countries. They must stand ready to open negotiations whenever they feel that by so doing their country will be benefited. Whenever a statesman at the head of the administration of our military departments assumes that his position gives him the right of making military decisions, he materially weakens the efficiency of that instrument of power which he should consider it his duty to increase. Even during the years of peace the same principles of conduct for the statesmen and civil administrators hold good. The creation of the instruments of force, their number and character, the location and

equipment of naval bases, the number of sailors required to man the fleet, the employment and training of the fleet, the military administration and up-keep of the fleet, together with all those things upon which the fleet is dependent—all these are functions which the military must perform. Untechnical civilian influence over any of these functions must, in the end, prove disastrous.

The civilian brings to his council the idea of economy. His training in civil life, in mercantile pursuits, where the object of all business is financial gain, has warped his mind to a worship of economy. To him military efficiency has no meaning. His attitude is a material one. When forced to decide between several articles of material, all of which in his unscientific eye appear equally efficient, his decision naturally will go to the one in which the least money is involved. In consequence the article accepted by him may be totally unserviceable to the military requirement. The military man, on the other hand, takes no thought of the cost where efficiency is at stake. For him there is no second best. One gun that will reach the enemy is worth a hundred whose range is just too short. A million dollars spent where military necessity demands may save a hundred million when war is declared. All such questions are military ones, and where

these are involved the military decision alone should be considered.

Naval ships are built each for its peculiar rôle in the service of the nation. Battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines should be called upon to perform only those duties which will perfect their training as instruments of war. Their organization and service should be controlled solely by military minds. These ships should not be scattered or dispersed on diplomatic service. Their power lies in unity of action and in co-ordinate training. Their function is battle and the preparation for battle. They should always be kept in the pink of condition, fully manned and trained for the object for which they alone owe their existence. The statesman's control over this force should be only to unleash it against an enemy's fleet for the purpose of emphasizing the national will. The peace duty of representing the nation on a foreign coast belongs to gunboats, the non-military units of the fleet, which should be built for that sole purpose. Such vessels may carry few guns and small crews, but the emblem of nationality flying at their flagstaffs is, nevertheless, still the embodiment of the diplomatic and military power of the nation. Such a representative in a foreign port carries with it the same quantity of prestige as the entire fleet, were it there assembled. It

is a mistaken idea of our diplomacy that a purpose can be better accentuated with many ships of war than with one. Such a conception reveals only a glaring weakness in a diplomacy, pointing to the hope of avoiding more drastic measures by the use of a great show of force. If diplomacy has proved its strength and its determination of purpose, then the sending of one gunboat will be sufficient to announce that our diplomacy calls for certain action, which, if refused, will lead to acts of coercion that will impose the dictum. Keeping the battle fleet as a unit at its work of preparation strengthens the hands of diplomacy; scattering it, using the units on eccentric missions, destroys the unity and cohesiveness of the fleet as an instrument of war.

This is a point of view which the naval officer often finds it most difficult to explain to the civilian. Between him and his civilian friends there lies a great gulf which neither seems able to bridge. Each apparently thinks in a different language. Words and phrases do not convey the same meaning to each of them. It has been repeatedly asserted by some of our naval officers for many years, and with more emphasis during the last two years, that the navy was not prepared for war. The civilian looked at the naval list and at the types and numbers of ships, he considered our great navy-yards, and refused to

believe that the naval man was in earnest. He then went aboard a battleship, he observed the officers and men at work; he saw the marvellous organization that exists on board our ships of war; he made a cruise in a single ship or with the fleet; he noted the precision with which the ships kept position and the ease with which the ships were handled in manœuvres, and then he came to the conclusion that the naval man is wrong and belittled the efficiency of his own instruments.

But the naval man knows. He has studied and observed the work of other nations. He knows that, while we have the ships, the other nations not only have them also but use them legitimately in preparation for war. He appreciates that the foreign governments make appropriations each year for mobilizations and for manœuvres in which each type falls into the place that it would actually occupy in war. He knows that his country will spend the money to build ships, and to partially man them, but that it begrudges the money for the training essential to make them proficient in the art of fighting an enemy's fleet. He knows that while other nations have created general staffs, whose sole care is the making of plans and directing of the peace administration and training of the fleet, that in his own country this most technical and neces-

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sary work, when it is done at all, is usually directed by civilian control.¹ He knows that military advice upon the use of the fleet, upon the preparation of the fleet, upon the training of the fleet, although given, is not always accepted.

What we civilians do not seem to appreciate is that the naval men have more than a personal interest in the navy. They have a personal interest in the welfare of their country which the navy alone can protect. The ban of secrecy has prevented them from openly expressing their full views. Occasionally, an anonymous writer dares to raise his voice against the methods of naval control. His criticisms are honest, and usually reflect the unanimous opinion of his colleagues. The mouthpiece of the navy—the United States Naval Institute—has published article after article condemning our naval administration as faulty

¹ The General Board of the Navy has the supervision of the making of war plans, but as it has no legal status or executive power, it can neither compel action nor interest the "civilian control" to understand them and take the action necessary. The civilian secretary of the navy, thanks to our faulty system of administration, is left in a state of complete isolation as regards the general management of the navy at large. There exists, as Secretary Moody testified before the Naval Committee of the House, on April 11, 1904, "no body charged with the duty of giving responsible advice upon military matters." "It is not enough," he added, "that there should be plenty of officers ready to give him advice when he seeks it. There should be those charged expressly with the duty of studying military questions, and of giving advice for which they can be held responsible." What this "defect in a vital part" of our naval administration is, will be shown further on.

in principle, disastrous to the efficiency of the navy, and dangerous to the welfare of the nation. The civil administrators, whenever they feel that they have been personally attacked, defend themselves by appealing to our form of government, which, according to their statements, provides for civilian control over the military. But such statements are only true in the wording and not in the intention of our form of government.

Our government reflects the will of the people. Our people are civilized and scientific in their commercial dealings. If our citizens would stop and consider that one like themselves, untrained and uneducated in naval matters, was making far-reaching military decisions; that, in fact, he held in his hand the military direction of our navy, with all that goes with it, he would be aghast and doubtless tremble for the future of the nation in case it went to war. The spirit of our government requires a civilian at the head of the Navy Department to administer the financial expenditures allotted to the service by Congress.¹ That

¹ "It has been asserted," wrote Admiral Luce a few years ago, "that a naval officer of rank and experience should be placed at the head of the navy. But naval officers are not fitted by training or habits of thought for making good ministers of state. This is well illustrated by the experience in England, where the civilian First Lord, assisted by naval men, has proved the ideal. From the experience of the greatest naval power of the day, we are, therefore, led to conclude that a civilian secretary of the navy, assisted by a board of naval officers, is the main point in a naval administration that will stand the test of a great war."

civilian should bring to the Navy Department a knowledge of business methods. The business administration of the Navy Department is in his hands. He is intrusted by the nation with this great instrument of force, and the nation will expect him to render an account of his stewardship. The ultimate test of his success in war will be in the exploits of the fleet. If he is truly honest with himself and big enough to acknowledge that there is a great field of effort beyond his mental capabilities, through no fault of his own, he will, as any man would upon whom has been thrust a great responsibility, surround himself with men of known integrity and ability to direct those parts of his organization to which his knowledge does not extend. These men would further surround themselves with men whose knowledge was more minute in the collateral branches of the naval profession. In this way in the office of the civil administrator of the navy would be formed what is termed in Europe a general staff.

Our navy, in time of peace, is kept at peace strength. For the purposes of war, either in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, a great increase of our fleet would be necessary. There would have to be purchased, or chartered, merchant ships, colliers, oilers, supply vessels, ammunition ships, tenders, mother ships, hospital ships, mine-laying ships, and trawlers for mine-sweeping. Many of

these vessels would be ready for immediate use, but some would require conversion for their new military duties. It has been found that, in order to supply these auxiliary vessels to the number and kind required for an oversea campaign, 80 per cent of the American merchant marine on the Atlantic and Pacific would have to be impressed on the outbreak of hostilities. The acquisition of all these vessels by the government would completely paralyze our coastwise traffic and decrease the efficiency of the nation in its manufacturing and commercial activities during the continuance of military operations. If the war is in the Pacific the transcontinental railroads will have to utilize their fuel-carrying facilities to the utmost to carry the navy's fuel from the great coal and oil fields of the east to the Pacific slope. Foreign merchant vessels might be bought by the government in large numbers, but their purchase would have to be completed before the declaration of war, and, besides, under our form of government no funds would be available for such purpose until actually appropriated by Congress. After the declaration of war no neutral country would permit its citizens to sell merchant vessels for war purposes to a belligerent. A workable scheme must, therefore, be prepared and prepared immediately to furnish the fleet with this required quota of auxiliary ships, and,

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at the same time, secure the nation's coastwise trade to the purposes of the nation. This vast field requires a study by both military and commercial men for its successful accomplishment.

The responsibility for the preparation of this necessary means of prosecuting a naval war rests, in the meantime, with the navy. It would be the duty of a naval general staff, did we have one. The broad field of naval mobilization must be scientifically investigated. Investigation by independent individuals or by the Navy Department bureaus working within themselves may accomplish a result, but it will be dearly bought and at the expense of the fleet. We must bring to this study a concentration of effort. The work already accomplished by others should be co-ordinated under a responsible military leader. The entire plan of mobilization must be understood through all its ramifications by the executive military authority in order that the machinery of mobilization may work smoothly and quickly when the order to mobilize is issued. A study of the work of a foreign general staff, such as that of Germany, Italy, France, Austria, England, Japan, and even China, must show us that we cannot afford, in these days of progress and civilization, to remain indifferent. Other departments of the government may continue their unscientific methods; there but little harm

is done. But unscientific methods, a lack of system, want of preparation, or civil interference mean more in the great military departments. Unpreparedness spells disaster to the nation, the loss of many thousand trained lives of our citizens, sailors, and soldiers. It means yet more—it involves national dishonor.

Unfortunately for the human race, half-disasters do not awaken nations; otherwise our nation would have appreciated its dearly bought lessons after the Spanish War. Prussia should have awakened after Valmy, but Jena was necessary to open the eyes of the German people. Eventually, however, the revelation took place, and in the modern Germany we see what whole disasters accomplished for the nation. In every civil occupation we have learned to bring science to our aid in organizing, systematizing, and administering our business. Commercial men point with pride to their planning department, where every detail of the business is worked up, and each step in the process of manufacture is carefully laid out and followed. Yet, in the business of government, those fundamental truths that we apply to our private business are strangely ignored.¹

¹How long would it be before a business conducted along the lines of our present naval administration went into the hands of a receiver? That was what happened to our navy from 1842 to and including the year 1889, during which there was a gradual but sure decadence. The truth of this statement is amply borne out by the annual reports of successive secretaries of the navy.

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In the evolution of man from a protoplasmic cell, about the last step was the creation of intelligence. The Department of the Navy is following this law of evolution. But it must yet be struck with the fairy wand to be made into a thinking entity. This creation of intelligence, in order that the organization may bring system into its life, means the forming of a general staff—not merely a vest-pocket encyclopædia, where important information may be instantly obtained, but an executive body, endowed with power of execution for which it will stand responsible to the country as regards the navy's preparation for war. The creation of a general staff for the navy is important when we realize that the government has no continuing body of men whose duty it is to prepare the entire nation for a conflict, to study the policies of competing nations, to discover where our policies are liable to create diplomatic friction, to study the means of averting conflicts, to decide as to the quantity of means needed for the purpose—in a word, to co-ordinate the policies of the nation with the means at hand to give them effect.¹

¹ At present there exists a general board and Naval War College, but neither is equipped for adequately performing the duties of a naval general staff. The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the general board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and material of the navy are such that they have had neither the time nor the opportunity to fully prepare in detail and perfect this work. After hearing the opinions

The army and the navy are for the purposes of war. This fact is simple of comprehension, yet how many are willing to understand it? If, then, the army and the navy are for the purposes of war, the question arises: "War with whom?" This question is not one for the army man or the navy man to answer. It is a question which the statesmen of the country must answer. Once this question is answered, and definite opponents are pointed out, then the nation should ask those responsible in the control of the army and the navy: "Are the army and the navy ready for war with this or that enemy?" Readiness is a comparable term. The army and the navy may be ready for war with Mexico, with South America, with China, with Africa, and, maybe, with Turkey; but those countries are not our probable enemies. If the enemy pointed out by the statesmen were England, Germany, or Japan, the opinion of the army and navy would be that we were not now ready for war, and that, to wage a war, any one of those countries would tax to its limit the resources of the entire country. Vast sums of

of naval officers on this subject, the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives urged the necessity for an office in the naval establishment that would fill this great and vital need of an executive and military branch for the proper employment of the vessels of our navy. The naval appropriation bill recently passed by Congress fortunately contains a provision for the creation of such a legalized chief of naval operations.

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money would have to be spent hurriedly and without opportunity for proper consideration.

Perhaps an outline of our naval organization would not here be amiss.

The present system of administration in the Navy Department was established in 1842, to succeed the Board of Navy Commissioners, who are generally supposed to have been supplanted because they had no individual duties or responsibilities.¹ At its head is a civilian secretary of the navy, who is assisted in his administration by an assistant secretary of the navy. Under the secretary the civil and industrial work of the department is carried on by bureaus whose chiefs are each personally responsible to him for the performance of the duties assigned to them by law. These chiefs of bureaus have executive authority extending even to the fleet.² The Bureau of Navigation is charged with the maintenance of

¹ These commissioners assisted the secretary of the navy by their counsel in the "employment of vessels of war," and "executed such orders as the secretary shall receive from the President."

² This is a violation of the fundamental military principle, the granting to a subordinate executive powers equal to those of his superior in rank; it is a direct infringement upon the prerogatives of the secretary of the navy—a fatal defect in the law. In fact, this provision of the act, in practice, creates eight secretaries of the navy, each one, in his own particular sphere, clothed with executive authority equal to that of the constitutional commander-in-chief. This is what has created the dire confusion, duplication of work, extravagance, and irresponsibility which, according to several secretaries of the navy in the past, have characterized the business methods of the Navy Department for the last seventy years.

the personnel of the naval establishment and with the discipline and education of the service. The Bureau of Ordnance is charged with the design and manufacture of guns, armor, torpedoes, ammunition, and explosives. The Bureau of Construction and Repair, composed of naval architects, is charged with all that relates to the construction and repair of the ships of the navy. The Bureau of Steam Engineering designs and builds the machinery for all our vessels of war. The Bureau of Yards and Docks, the chief of which is a civil engineer, has charge of the designing, building, and maintenance of the dry docks, wharfs, and buildings at the navy-yards. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is charged with the health of the personnel. And, lastly, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is charged with the purchase of all food, clothing, supplies, and even ships, and with the disbursing of all moneys appropriated for the naval service.

In addition to the bureaus, the organization of the Navy Department includes the judge-advocate general, whose duties are to consider and report upon all legal questions relating to the personnel; the solicitor, who attends to the other legal matters, such as contracts pertaining to the service; the general board, which considers the plans for the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war; and the office of naval intel-

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ligence, which collects information relating to foreign navies and to other subjects of interest to the naval service.

The various activities essential to so complex an institution are thus accounted for. But, as Mr. Meyer pointed out in his annual report for 1909, the business of the department has entirely outgrown its original 1842 organization and its reorganization of 1862. The most serious defects he mentioned were the deplorable lack of a branch dealing directly and solely with the military use of the fleet and the lack of responsible expert advisers to aid the secretary in reaching conclusions in case of disagreement between the co-ordinate branches of the department.

The business administration of the Navy Department seemed logically to divide itself into groups under personnel, material, and the operations or management of the personnel and material. So, to provide himself with professional and responsible advisers in co-ordinating the work of the department, Mr. Meyer detailed four officers of the rank as aides to the secretary of the navy in matters of general policy. These officers have been continued by the present secretary of the navy. They act solely in an advisory capacity and have no supervisory or executive power. The aide for operations advises the secretary as to strategic and tactical matters and

regarding the movements of the fleet. The aide for material advises him upon the material condition of the fleet. The aide for personnel advises him upon matters affecting the officers and men of the fleet. The aide for inspections, recently abolished, advised him upon the condition of the fleet and upon the state and management of the navy-yards. The aide for education, recently appointed, advises him upon the *academic* education of the fleet, not upon its education for *battle*.

The statutes assume that if a secretary has a head for each of the activities required by the fleet, that he can decide the best way to act. This the last secretary of the navy, Mr. Meyer, realized was erroneous. The heads of the technical bureaus are usually too much immersed in their own specialties to assist the secretary, a civilian and not a military man, in making correct military decisions.¹ Mr. Meyer, therefore,

¹ To quote from Secretary Moody's testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, April 11, 1904:

"It may be said that the secretary already has the chiefs of bureaus as advisers. At the heads of those bureaus, now established by law, there are and will be competent officers with adequate technical and military information. They are abundantly able to give safe counsel on the important duties with which their respective bureaus are charged; but they are engrossed with the duties of the administration of their bureaus. They have no responsibility for the consideration of these military questions to which I have referred, nor any duty to give advice upon them; and the world's experience has shown that no advice is good except that for which advisers are held

instituted the policy of having advisers to the secretary. In other words, he realized that in his short tenure of office as secretary he could not make himself into a military man; that he could not get the military training required to efficiently manage the military organization unaided. He knew that he was a good business man, and a successful one, but his business had not been that of the navy. He did not have behind him an experience of thirty odd years of sea service. He felt that the information given to him by the bureaus must be placed in such shape by his

responsible. The volunteer adviser is not usually of much assistance. Much as I have profited by the advice of the bureau chiefs, I know by practical experience that it is impossible for them to take from their administrative duties the time which will enable them to consider these questions with such deliberation as would render them willing to accept responsibility for advice.

"There is another side to the question. On the other side, I deem it of the greatest importance that no body should be created which would usurp the powers of the secretary and make him its mere mouthpiece or reduce him to a mere figurehead in naval organization. I believe that is not only of importance to the country but of equal importance to the navy itself. It is the secretary alone who can bring effective influence to bear upon the national administration or, in conference with the representatives of the legislative part of our government, carry such weight that proper measures will be enacted by Congress and proper supplies afforded. Of course, it is ultimately upon the action of Congress that all naval efficiency must depend. I do not care how efficient a general staff may be, or any body called by another name, however well that body may understand the needs of the navy: they can never, in my opinion, except in times of great emergency, wield that influence which brings into harmonious co-operation the national administration, the military power, and the authority of Congress which governs us all."

aides that he, untrained in naval matters, could handle it as a business man. In fact, his aides were for the purpose of translating the naval facts into language within his grasp and understanding. When once these facts were so presented to him, he, as a good business man, could render a correct decision. Then, once this decision was given, the naval aides were delegated the power of the secretary to carry out that decision. The secretary and his naval aides looked upon the questions confronting the navy from the point of naval efficiency, and each decision was made with the idea of gaining efficiency for the navy, and the execution of the idea, in consequence, steadily increased the efficiency of the fleet.

One of the first acts of Congress should be logically to legalize the council of aides and to make one of the aides paramount, like first sea lord of the British navy, to whom the English people look for efficiency of their fleet.

We have seen recently how a similar democracy, England, upon going to war, placed a military man in control of her War Office. Lord Kitchener was about to start for Egypt when the war in Europe broke out. But the English, knowing the unpreparedness of their army and appreciating that its preparation could be accomplished in a relatively short time only by a military man of the caliber of Kitchener, at once

installed him as the first war lord of England. On the other hand, Admiral Sir John Fisher is practically in control of the admiralty; the first lord doubtless accepts his plans in all naval matters, for it is to Sir John Fisher that the English people look for naval results and not to Winston Churchill.

Some years ago, in 1909, a commission was appointed by the President of the United States, whose report should be known to every American. It is no more or less than a recapitulation of the fundamental principles underlying a military administration for the Navy Department. This document clears the atmosphere. Its language is so plain and so eloquent that any one upon reading it must be convinced of its soundness. The board was composed of men whose honesty of purpose cannot be questioned. They were William H. Moody, Paul Morton, Stephen B. Luce, Alfred T. Mahan, and A. G. Dayton. Unfortunately, these men are of a persuasion in politics different from those now in power, but their decisions, as can be seen, are divorced from any conception of partisan politics.

The report of the commission is as follows:

1. The Office of the Secretary of the Navy being executive in character, nothing should be admitted into an organization of the Department which would qualify his authority or diminish his ultimate responsibility. He

has been in the past, and in the future should be, a civilian. He is the representative of the President, the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, under whose direction his authority is exercised.

2. The duties in charge of the Secretary divide under the principal heads, closely related, but generically distinct: military and civil.

The civil duties embrace the provision or preparation of all material of war. This is the function of the present bureaus.

The military duties concern the use of that material, whether in war or in such exercises as conduce to fitness for operations of war. For the direction of these military duties, no subordinate provision corresponding to the bureaus on the civil side exists in the present organization.

3. The discharge of both these classes of duty involves a multitude of activities, quite beyond the immediate personal knowledge and supervision of a single man. This necessitates a subdivision of the duties, by which means the supervision of the Secretary is exerted through the medium of responsible subordinates. In this subdivision the PRINCIPLE OF UNDIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY, WITHIN THE APPOINTED FIELD OF SUBORDINATE SUPERVISION, should obtain as it does in the superior office of the Secretary.

The bureau system, as now established by law for the civil activities of the department, insures for each bureau this undivided responsibility, qualified only by the authority of the Secretary, which, if exerted, does not divide the responsibility, but transfers it to the Secretary himself. INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY, with UNDIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY, though in principle proper, suffers historically from intrinsic inability to co-operate, where a number of such independent units are present. The Marshals

of the first Napoleon—especially in Spain—in the absence of the Emperor, offer a familiar illustration. The bureau system constituted by law contains no remedy for this inherent defect.

4. The co-ordinating power is in the Secretary's authority; but, owing to the shortness of tenure in office, and to the inevitable unfamiliarity with naval conditions with which an incumbent begins, authority, though adequate in principle, is not so in effect. This inadequacy consists in lack of personal familiarity with the subjects before him, not merely severally, but in their collective relations; in short, lack of specific knowledge and experience. The organization should provide him with such knowledge and experience, digested formally, so as to facilitate his personal acquirement; in short, an advisory body, equipped not with advice merely, but with reasons. In order to avoid the interruption of continuity attending each new administration, entailing the recurrent temporary unfamiliarity of each new Secretary, it is expedient that this advisory body be composed of several persons; but while this provision would insure the continuity which inheres in a corporate body, in this case continuity of knowledge and progress, the principle of undivided responsibility would dictate that ONE only of them should be responsible for the advice given to the common superior, the Secretary.

5. As regards the composition of the advisory body, the principles to be regarded are two:

(A) The end dictates the means.

(B) The responsibility must be individual, in advice as well as in executive action.

(A) The end is efficiency in war. The agents in war are the military naval officers. Their profession qualifies them best to pronounce upon the character of the prepa-

rations of every kind for war, including not only schemes of campaign and tactical systems, but the classes, sizes, qualities, and armaments of ships of war.

What the Secretary needs, specifically and above all, is a clear understanding and firm grasp of leading military considerations. Possessed of these, he may without great difficulty weigh the recommendations of his technical assistants, decide for himself and depend upon them for technical execution of that which he approves.

However constituted in detail, the advisory body should be taken entirely from the class to which belongs the conduct of war, and upon them will fall in war the responsibility for the use of the instruments and for the results of the measures which they recommend.

(B) As regards individual responsibility for advice, it is suggested that the Secretary of the Navy nominate to the President the officer whom he deems best fitted to command the great fleet in case of war arising; and that this officer, irrespective of his seniority, should be head of the advisory body. He alone should be the responsible adviser of the Secretary.

The provision of a responsible adviser does not compel the Secretary to accept his advice, nor prevent his consulting whomsoever else he will. The provision suggested does not limit the authority of the Secretary; but it does provide him with the weightiest and most instructed counsel, and it lays upon the prospective Commander-in-Chief the solemn charge that in all he recommends he is sowing for a future which he himself may have to reap.

An essential principle in the constitution of such an advisory body is that the majority of the members should be on the active list and should go afloat at no infrequent intervals; and, specifically, the head of the body, the

prospective Commander-in-Chief, should during the summer months take command of the fleet when concentrated for manœuvres, etc., to sustain his familiarity with administrative routine and other practical matters.

6. In the two principal classes into which the duties of the Secretary of the Navy divide, civil and military, as enunciated in Section 2 above, the word "civil" corresponds largely to the activities known as technical; and there is no reason apparent why the same principle of undivided immediate responsibility should not be realized in the Navy Department in two chief subordinates, responsible, the one for military supervision, the other for technical supervision, and for all information and advice given to the Secretary under these two heads. It is of course apparent that a perfectly suitable Secretary may come to his office with as little previous knowledge of the kind called technical as he has of military; nay, he may be perfectly efficient, and yet not acquire in his four years of office either the technical or the military knowledge presumable in men whose lives have been given to the two professions. Under the most favorable conditions, every superior must take decisions largely on advice; which means not accepting another's opinions blindly, but accepting statements of facts and weighing reasons.

The principle of the Secretary's ultimate individual responsibility dictates that he be at liberty to consult as many advisers as he thinks necessary; but the principle of the individual responsibility of two chief advisers, for the advice given, tends to insure the most exhaustive consideration on the part of men selected for their special competency. Careful consideration with special competency give the best guarantees for advice, and a Secretary overruling it would do so under the weightiest sense of personal responsibility.

Can any one doubt the soundness of these principles? They apply not only to a military service, but to any great commercial organization. For instance, the president of a railroad must be ultimately responsible for the efficiency of his road, yet he will not invade the provinces of his subordinates who, in their specialties, are thoroughly capable of giving efficient and loyal service. Each brings to his work a special knowledge and experience which may or may not be had by the president. The president will hold each responsible for his acts. The president and his council will decide the broad policies of the road. These policies will guide the subordinates in their work. The general manager, assistant general manager, general superintendent, etc., through their intimate knowledge of the requirements of the railroad, will also guide the president and his council in their work. The president of a railroad would not disregard the responsibility of his traffic manager by directing against his technical advice the introduction of special trains or changing the existing schedules, for in so doing the president of a railroad knows that dangerous collisions would result and many lives would be lost.

Let us look back into our history and see how the Navy Department prepared for the war with Spain. As early as the middle of March, 1898,

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the government in Washington began to prepare for war. In the next six months 102 vessels of all sorts, even tugs and ferry-boats, were bought. They were inspected by boards of naval officers, but the emergency was great and thorough inspections were impossible. There had been no inspection of vessels before the war as to their fitness for war purposes. Twenty-one million four hundred and fifty thousand dollars were spent on these vessels. During the war the active fleet was increased by 130 ships. Many of the purchased vessels were converted into auxiliary cruisers, the conversion of which required at least a one month's stay at the navy-yards. The navy personnel was increased from 13,000 to 25,000. Vast supplies were purchased at exorbitant prices. In many cases there had been no contract for supplies before the war, and the Navy Department was forced to accept the best terms it could get.

In Washington all was confusion until Captain Mahan arrived, bringing with him an atmosphere of calm and sound deliberation and a comprehensive knowledge of fundamental strategical principles. A naval war council was immediately formed. A state of war having arisen, the secretary of the navy at once realized the necessity of a general staff. This war board, or general staff, organized an information service which gave Admiral Sampson his only certain news among the

vast amount of rumors as to the movements of the enemy. Admiral Mahan was a typical general staff officer. He had studied for years at the Naval War College the strategical situation of the United States. In his lectures before the War College he had developed a sound strategy for the navy which, upon the outbreak of war, became the navy's plan of campaign. Whatever merits there were in the conduct of our naval war with Spain belong to him. His genius was the navy's guiding star.

The war having been brought to a successful end, the naval board was dismissed.

Any one who witnessed the confusion, not only in the Navy Department in Washington, but at all the navy-yards and recruiting stations in 1898, can multiply that confusion by about six and then obtain a fair picture of what would happen in case the United States went to war within the year. The size of our present navy, ships and men, is just six times its size in 1898. To plan the opening moves in our mobilization requires a general staff composed of men who have given several years to a close study of the conditions of naval war. They must prepare that plan to the most minute detail, and have it always ready for promulgation.

The next war will probably not be with another Spain. It will be with a country which has worked

out such a plan of mobilization, and who, doubtless, knows of our unpreparedness. The enemy, therefore, will use his utmost endeavors to cut short our time of preparation, and force us to fight unprepared by striking swiftly and secretly.

The United States is considered to be one of the world's most scientific nations. Methods of scientific management are the rule in business. The army's methods are becoming more scientific, due to the tutelage of the general staff and the Army War College, but the navy is, if anything, still deep in the mire of red tape. Our navy-yards are so congested with work, and the hand of the politician rules there so strongly that even the supreme influence of the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet has been powerless to limit the prolonged stay of ships at navy-yards. The methods of buying material for the navy require such a length of time that repairs to ships which should be effected in a few weeks are delayed often many months. There are battleships and other vessels that have spent at the navy-yards 50 per cent of their first few years in commission, and against this disorganizing condition the commander-in-chief of the fleet seems powerless.

One of the greatest authorities in naval matters, in discussing our naval administration, has said:

It is conceded that the present organization of the Navy Department . . . has performed the business of

the Navy Department adequately; its shortcomings have not been due to any deficiency in skill or want of business capacity in administration, but rather because the organization has lacked the principle of responsible military advice to the Secretary.

The object and ultimate end of the Navy Department are to build, arm, equip, and man the fleet in order to prepare it for war. It is conceivable that in a highly developed industrial community like our own the business of the Navy Department might, under its Secretary, be restricted to its military duties only, the supplies of every nature, including the vessels themselves and their entire war outfit, being obtained by purchase, as has been illustrated in certain foreign countries. The predominant character and importance of efficient military counsel will thus be appreciated.

The convincing soundness of this advice upon military administration has ever since been disregarded. It was given six years ago.

The navy-yards and the controlling bureaus of the Navy Department are merely outfitters and, if properly controlled, should work in cordial and intelligent support of each other to meet the demands of consumers, who, in this case, are the naval officers who use the material provided for them. To control the naval outfitters, to make them work in cordial and intelligent support of each other, is the duty of a general staff.

It must always be remembered that any successful business represents an accumulation of the ideas of many men. These ideas must have

a repository where they can be sifted out, tagged, and labelled to be used for the betterment of the service.

The cycle of our naval administration is not a closed one, and for that reason men untrained in the art of war are incapable of assaying profits. Congress appropriates the money wisely and unwisely. This money is converted into raw material and labor, and this raw material and labor are in turn converted into the finished product and service. But these finished products and service are not converted back into money. They have become something intangible, a potential power—a weapon ready for immediate use, but one the nation hopes it may never have to use. The steel of the blade, however, must be kept bright and sharp. Can a civilian secretary, with no experience in the art of war, tell by examining that instrument whether or not its blade is of true temper?

CHAPTER V

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

AMERICA, as has been shown, has the historical calling of guardian over the republican forms of government which have been established by the various peoples of this continent. Those traditional policies we must safeguard by preparedness, for our present position we shall not be able to maintain indefinitely without an appeal to arms. Fortunately, such an appeal does not, of necessity, mean war. Military preparation is an asset to the statesman. By the threat of an appeal to arms victories in peace can be won as lasting as those achieved on the field of battle. This, history has taught since the beginning of things. But let us also be forewarned; such a threat, given without the necessary force to back it, is futile and has always led to war.

Two principles that must govern the action of a nation in its preparation for possible conflict must be accepted by Americans. They are: (a)

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that the fleet is our first line of defense, and (b) that it is the duty of every male citizen to prepare himself for the military service of his country.

The naval and military armaments of the present day must be ready at all times if they are to be effective in time of need. The size of our fleet must be based upon that of its possible opponents. In order that we may have a fleet capable of achieving the aim of our naval strategy, the probable theatre of war must be studied and a knowledge gained of the character of the struggle which will have to be waged to gain command of the seas. The defense of our coast is assured when our control of the seas is secured. For the protection of our coast, although the end is defensive, the means will not be defensive. The fleet cannot merely stand on guard. Its fighting power cannot be frittered away by being thinly spread along our entire coast-line. It must have "*force*" as a fleet; it must have mobility. And that fleet must have more than that mobility; it must be capable of gaining information of the enemy's movements and able to maintain its activity in whatever area of hostilities it may be drawn. Its primary duty is to find and engage the naval power of the enemy. "Force" rests on battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. "Mobility" indicates great individual size and steaming

radius. To gather information of the enemy, to avoid surprise, and to bring the hostile squadrons to action require fast scouts of great steaming radius. To maintain the fleet's activity in the area of probable hostilities requires well-equipped and protected naval bases, colliers, repair ships, mother ships for submarines and tenders, ammunition ships, mine-layers, mine-sweepers, and hospital ships. The study of the creation, organization, administration, and management of such a fleet is a scientific one solely. The statesman, a civilian, points out the probable antagonist. This information is in the keeping of the statesman. The question of the disposition and the use of a fleet to accomplish the national purpose—that is, the perpetuation of its policies—cannot be intrusted to those whose sole fitness for the task lies in their capabilities as leaders in the internal politics of the country. The nation must insist that where a question arises concerning the navy as a fighting machine, that question shall be decided by those who have given a life of study to naval affairs. To permit a politician, be he ever so patriotic, to make military or naval decisions, is to court disaster.

On the side of organization alone, it is well to bear in mind that a military force—a fleet or an army—cannot be levied en masse and led at once successfully into battle. It is first neces-

sary to train the personnel and prepare the vast material required. Military preparation we must consider in the light of a great social benefit. Such preparation raises the capabilities of the nation as a unit, which is a great national asset and a strong card in the hands of the statesman. In its more technical sense, preparation provides for the conduct of a war and supplies the means to carry it through. In our every-day walks of life, in business, in the arts and sciences, social competition is evident on every hand. Those hold the field who are intellectually well equipped for the contest. So it is with nations. Military service is well known to develop the intellectual and moral fibre of the individual. Through him it benefits the nation by rendering him more efficient for the occupations of peace. Military training gives a man the full mastery of his body; exercises and increases his initiative; develops self-reliance and decision of character. It teaches him to subordinate his will to a higher recognized authority. It develops in him those necessary qualities, self-respect and courage, both moral and physical. It is time that we realized that training in the profession of arms is a national asset which increases the wealth of the nation by increasing the efficiency of its individuals in the arts, in industries, in trade, and in commerce. A military nation will successfully embark in

enterprises which the non-military nation, fearing the risk involved, will refuse to undertake.

It is now a well-recognized fact, that our histories have suppressed the military lessons which should have been forcibly brought before the people of the country. Our studied lack of preparedness in the military art has now been tested during more than a century. We have engaged in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars, and have in every one achieved the final success. But how many Americans have realized the price at which that success has been bought, or considered the delays and disasters that prolonged our wars till, in nearly every instance, our national resources were completely exhausted? Has not the final outcome in each case deluded the popular mind into the belief that we are, as a nation, invincible?

How many Americans have any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized our past wars? With a first-class power we have never yet been engaged. England, in her wars with us, has always been occupied elsewhere and never could spare more than a small part of her forces to war on us. Yet in the Revolutionary War it took 231,771 of our Continental troops and 164,000 minutemen to defeat the 150,605 soldiers that England sent to the discontented colonies. Our regulars bore the brunt of the fighting heroically, but our undisci-

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plined militia tarnished the honor of our arms on more than one occasion.

In the War of 1812 the navy alone saved us from national dishonor. But the successful cruises and the brilliant victories of the *Constitution* and of her consorts were not the entire record of those years of almost uninterrupted disasters on land. Our 56,032 regular troops and the 471,622 militia that we called into the field were shamefully routed, time and again—except at Lundy's Lane and at New Orleans—by less than 55,000 British and Canadians. Again, in the Mexican War of 1846 we were fortunate. Our antagonist here was racially weaker, yet no less than 30,000 regular troops and 73,532 militia and volunteers were required to conquer less than 47,000 ill-fed and ill-equipped Mexicans.

And in 1861 our national resources were almost completely exhausted by the delays and disasters that characterized the first few months of the conflict—disasters that could have been avoided in every case by adequate preparation. It is questionable whether there ever would have been a war, had the Federal Government had the proper trained force at hand. Yet a few months before the war it was actually proposed in Congress to abolish the navy.¹

¹ In the Civil War the United States employed 67,000 regulars, and 2,605,000 militia and volunteers to defeat 978,664 Confederates. And in the Spanish-American War of 1898 we were compelled to

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Do we realize that if our fleet were defeated to-day, nothing would stand between us and the invasion of our territory? Our pitifully small army could not possibly defend our entire sea-coast, and the undisciplined hordes that would be called to the colors would be almost as useless for military purposes as would a like number of sheep or horses. The average American believes that if the danger of invasion were imminent, the nation would rise as one man to repel the invader; but nations cannot rise as one man unless their organization for the purpose has been carefully worked out beforehand, and they themselves have been previously trained for the task.

Leaving out of consideration the possible menace of the European nations, let us consider the case of Japan. In the '90's her policy clashed with the policies of China over the kingdom of Corea, which neither had a right to consider its prize. A war resulted. The subjects of the Japanese Empire had all been trained in the use of arms. Even at that date, Japan had organized a general staff, consisting of her greatest military intellects. The nation was fully prepared for the

raise 58,688 regulars, and 223,235 militia and volunteers to subdue less than 200,000 Spaniards. Two hundred thousand volunteers were called for by the President in April, 1898, yet, though every State responded instantly, the work of mobilizing these troops was conducted in so bungling a fashion that by the beginning of June only three regiments, in addition to the regulars, had reached the rendezvous at Tampa, Florida.

struggle which her statesmen had foreseen. China, in a manner strikingly similar to the methods of this republic, refused to believe that war was possible. In China, the military was considered of an inferior cloth to the scholar, the idealist, the civilizer, the poet. War came suddenly, but it came at the very moment when the statesmen of Japan had decided it should come. Japan won, of course, but she was deprived of the fruits of the war through the acts of a coalition of European nations. All that was left to her was the island of Formosa, in which she now has a naval base that will prove most useful in her next war, when the [probable area of naval hostilities will be in the waters of the Philippines.]

Russia forced Japan to give up the territory won by the sword in Manchuria, and occupied it herself. Japan, from that moment, began to prepare herself for a war with Russia. The Emperor called his military and naval advisers together at the imperial palace at Tokio. He said to them: "We must fight Russia." They answered: "Your Majesty, it is impossible; we cannot win. Give us ten years and we shall be ready to fight." In nine years the statesmen and military and naval advisers of the Emperor went to him and said: "We are ready." Russia meanwhile had expended money and resources in building the great railroad from Saint Petersburg to

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Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Her people had peacefully penetrated vast areas of Manchuria. Manchuria was becoming rapidly Russianized. The war that followed is too fresh in our minds for us to forget. The surprise of the world was great when Japan, that small island empire, began the war precipitately, and with victory after victory, finally beat the Russian giant to his knees, and won back the territory that Russia had taken from her through the power of diplomacy, backed by the threat of a coalition of force too powerful to resist. Since this war, Japan has been able to direct all her energies toward the preparation for a war which her statesmen have foreseen to be necessary in order to carry out her purpose, which is the political control of the Pacific Ocean and its commerce.

To resist the attack of such a nation as we have seen Japan to be, our preparation must be methodical and scientific. No longer can we afford to continue our unscientific and haphazard methods of building a fleet and administering it. No longer can we afford to believe that our small army will be capable of meeting the demands which it will be called upon to meet in the event of a war with Japan.

Our fleet in the Atlantic Ocean now consists of 8 dreadnaughts, 2 semidreadnaughts, 11 predreadnaughts, 21 destroyers, 17 submarines, 2

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armored cruisers, 3 scout cruisers, and about 8 gunboats. This fleet is manned¹ and ready for service. In addition, there are in reserve 7 pre-dreadnaughts, and 13 destroyers. The reserve fleet has only a nucleus crew. In the case of the reserve battleships, only 20 men of the thousand required to man them efficiently are on board. In the event of hostilities, they would require from 600 to 800 additional men each. But we have no reserves to draw upon, and every recruit would, therefore, be without previous training.

A battleship, and, in a lesser degree, a destroyer and a submarine follow the biological law of growth. In order to develop power, the ship must become a distinct entity. When first the crew is received, the ship is an awkward recruit, incapable of military service. If, while in this condition, it is put in the fleet, it weakens that fleet instead of strengthening it. The force of a battleship has too long, in this country, been reckoned solely by the size and power of its guns. No one seems to

¹ But not fully manned, since the 21 battleships in commission alone, according to the statement of the fleet's commander-in-chief, Admiral Fletcher, were, on January 28, 1915, 339 officers and 5,219 men short of the complements required to man them properly to efficiently fight them in battle. The dreadnaught *Utah* was in need of 27 commissioned officers out of 55 required; the *Florida* was short 26 officers out of 55 required; the *South Carolina* had only 21 out of 48, and the *Michigan* 22 out of 48. In the case of only three ships of the first battle line was the shortage under double figures!

have thought of the psychological, the spiritual side, which is of such overwhelming importance.

On paper, the Atlantic fleet is said to be composed of the following: 8 dreadnaughts, 2 semi-dreadnaughts, and 18 predreadnaughts, and in destroyers 34 modern vessels. Of these, 8 predreadnaughts and 16 destroyers are immature in their development as fighting units. Naval experts agree that at least one year is required for the development of a raw crew into an efficient battle unit. Recently the world was amazed at the ease with which two German armored cruisers, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, destroyed, in a battle off the Chilean coast, the British armored cruisers *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, with but negligible damage to themselves. True, the armament of the German vessels was superior in caliber and in carrying power to that of their opponents, but this alone could not account for the reason why, in an hour's engagement, the British cruisers failed to damage their victorious enemy. The vaunted British marksmanship had failed signally in the hour of battle. Then a veiled statement from the British admiralty gave the full explanation. The crews of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were not regulars. They were militia—reservists. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were not effective fighting units of the British fleet. Their crews were greatly augmented by

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recruits upon the outbreak of war. Their doom must be laid at the door of that faulty conception of naval administration which keeps, in time of peace, war-ships in reserve, or in "cold storage," and mans them hurriedly with raw and untrained crews in time of war.

This naval catastrophe should not have been needed to demonstrate the unfitness of a vessel manned in such a way. Naval men, in their studies and in the council chamber, should have been able to foretell the result of such a method of organization. We cannot, therefore, consider that our 8 reserve battleships, and our 16 reserve destroyers are full units of our battle fleet, since we have no "reserves" to call upon to fill up their complements. In a war with Japan or Germany we can count on only those vessels that have been maintained in time of peace continuously in full commission. In those vessels a soul has been created. They are spiritually, physically, and vitally full-grown organizations, capable of using to a maximum the great power of offense and defense embodied in the material, in the armament of the ship. The thinking naval men of this country have endeavored, for some years, to correct this grievous fault in our naval policy. They have stood for permanency in the personnel of our fighting units. They have condemned the policy of reserve fleets. But the civil administrators, dis-

regarding, if knowing, the biological law which governs the actions of organizations, have never been able to see that the ship must be something more than the armor and guns it carries. An unwise economy has prevented an increase of personnel to keep pace with the increasing number of the ships of our fleet. In order to keep the new vessels fully manned, the old vessels were retired into the reserve fleet, where they were left with only sufficient men on board to oil and paint their machinery and armament. In all our statistical comparisons with foreign navies, we have counted our reserve ships as full fighting units. The battle off the Chilean coast now forces the conclusion that we must, in our next comparison of fighting strength, scratch from the list our vessels of the reserve fleet, or else give them full crews and allow them to begin their growth to manhood.

If we scan our fleet in the Pacific we shall find in the active fleet 2 armored cruisers, 7 cruisers and gunboats, 5 destroyers, and 11 submarines. In the reserve fleet on that coast are 1 battleship, 3 armored cruisers, 3 large protected cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 2 old submarines. On the Asiatic station there is an active fleet of 1 first-class cruiser, 2 monitors, 2 cruisers, 10 gunboats, 5 old destroyers, and 9 submarines of the oldest type. Using the same argument in marshalling our war strength, we must, therefore, subtract

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from our total strength in the Pacific 1 battleship, 3 armored cruisers, 3 large first-class cruisers, and 4 destroyers, which are only the shells of fighting ships. Their spirit has not been created.

The result of the battle off Chile had a parallel a century ago in our own history when the *Chesapeake* fought the *Shannon* off Boston. The *Shannon* had been in commission for several years. Her crew was well trained, and had become a full-grown and matured organization. Her striking power was intellectually controlled. Her fighting capacity was the product of the power of guns and the capacity to use them. The *Chesapeake*, on the other hand, left the navy-yard, having just been fitted out. As a psychological entity she was in her incipency. She had just begun to "grow." She was a child in swaddling-cloths; yet she went out to fight a ship with a full-grown organization, leaving the melancholy, if heroic, tradition of a battle lost against odds. This lesson of the necessity for time in the evolution of a fighting unit, be it a regiment on land or a ship on the ocean, has been one difficult for the American people to grasp. A hundred years later in time of war we stand ready to commit the same military crime and would send against the Japanese and German fleets, composed entirely of fully matured units, our 9 reserve battleships, 3 reserve armored cruisers, 3 reserve first-class cruisers, and 16 re-

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serve destroyers. We would actually handicap our fleet with the care of these charges, while the people of the United States firmly believed that they had increased the power of the fleet by that number of ships. Let us take this second lesson of unpreparedness and use it to advantage. Let us fully man all our ships that are capable of offense, and keep them continually in full commission. Those for which we have not the personnel we must scratch off our lists of fighting ships and no longer consider them in the computation of our naval strength. A fully organized and fully manned navy may repel an invasion, or, at least, detain it, until the army has the time to mobilize. But without such a naval force we are helpless.

CHAPTER VI

OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS

A NATION'S foreign policy and the means of carrying it out must harmonize. Foreign policies, consequently, determine the size of a nation's fleet. This means that the determination of the naval forces necessary for national security, the principal characteristics of the units composing such forces, and the location and resources of bases of operation from which the action of the fleet is to be supported require previous knowledge of what may be termed the "constants," the fixed factors, of the international situation. This fundamental idea is known and accepted in every civilized country except America. We have international obligations and ambitious policies, but a fleet inadequate both in numbers and characteristics and deficient in actual bases of operations to support these ambitions.

When peace again has come to Europe no one can tell what naval forces will remain to the warring combatants. If Germany is successful, she will be stronger than ever, numerically and in morale. If she is defeated, many years will be

necessary before she can again compete in military and naval armaments.

On July 1, 1914, Germany had 17 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers in commission against 8 for the United States, while Japan holds only 4. In two years more, 1916, Germany would have had 28 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers against the United States' 12 and Japan's 10. If our policies are in conflict with those of Germany, by what course of reasoning can we dare to say that 12 dreadnaughts are sufficient to maintain our integrity against 28? In armored-cruiser strength Germany, the United States, and Japan are about equal. In cruiser strength, the advanced cavalry of a fleet, in 1916, Germany would have had 46, the United States 14, and Japan 13. In destroyers, Germany 154, the United States 62, and Japan 52. In submarines the United States will, at that date, be on an equality with Germany and will be in advance of Japan, but the German submarines are all of greater tonnage than those of the United States, and their effectiveness with the fleet will be vastly greater. We thus see that the United States has built a naval force at haphazard and without considering what is to be its ultimate use. It is not the fleet of our policy. It can neither defend the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic nor force the open door in the Pacific. Its weakness in scouts and destroyers for the purpose of locat-

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SEA STRENGTH—JULY 1, 1914

VESSELS BUILT

	Battleships Dreadnaught Type ¹	Battleships ²	Battle Cruisers	Armored Cruisers ³	Cruisers ⁴	Destroyers	Torpedo- Boats	Submarines	Coast-Defense Vessels ⁵
England.....	20	40	9	34	74 ⁶	167 ⁷	49	75 ⁸	0
Germany.....	13	20	4	9	41	130	0	27	2
United States...	8	22	0	11	14	51	13	30	4
France.....	4	18	0	20	9	84	135	64	1
Japan.....	2	13	2	13	13	50	27	13	2
Russia.....	0	7	0	6	9	91	14	30	2
Italy.....	3	8	0	9	6	32	68	19	0
Austria-Hungary	3	6	0	2	5	18	39	6	6

VESSELS BUILDING OR AUTHORIZED

England ⁶	16	..	1	..	17 ⁽⁹⁾	21 ⁽⁹⁾	0	22	..
Germany ⁷	7	..	4	..	5	24	0	18	..
United States...	4	..	0	..	0	11	0	19	..
France.....	8	..	0	..	0	3	0	22	..
Japan ⁸	4	..	2	..	0	2	0	2	..
Russia ¹⁰	7	..	4	..	8	44	0	19	..
Italy.....	7	..	0	..	2	15	2	8	..
Austria-Hungary	4	..	0	..	5	1	24	6	..

¹ Battleships having a main battery of all big guns (11 inches or more in caliber).

² Battleships of (about) 10,000 tons, or more displacement, and having more than one caliber in the main battery.

³ Armored cruisers having guns of largest caliber in main battery and capable of taking their place in line of battle with the battleships. They have an increase of speed at the expense of carrying fewer guns in main battery, and a decrease in armor protection.

⁴ Includes all unarmored cruising vessels above 1,500 tons' displacement.

⁵ Includes smaller battleships and monitors. No more vessels of this class are being produced or built by the great powers.

⁶ England has no continuing ship-building policy, but usually lays down each year 4 or 5 armored ships with a proportional number of smaller vessels.

⁷ Germany has a continuing ship-building programme, governed by a fleet law authorized by the Reichstag. For 1913 there are authorized 1 battleship, 1 battle cruiser, 2 cruisers, 12 destroyers. Eventual strength to consist of 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines.

⁸ \$78,837,569 authorized to be expended from 1911 to 1917 for the construction of war vessels.

⁹ Includes vessels of colonies.

¹⁰ Russian ship-building programme provides for the completion by 1918 of 4 battle cruisers, 8 small cruisers, 38 destroyers, and 18 submarines.

ing an advancing enemy in the Atlantic and bringing it to action is lamentable. Its power to carry on war in the Asiatic is rendered ineffective by its lack of auxiliaries and a secure base in the far East from which to operate.

This lack of preparedness, this failure to build a navy commensurate to our purpose, speaks ill of the effectiveness, in practice, of popular government. In the continual strife between the two great rival parties in America, the navy has been the shuttlecock. The indifference of our statesmen has permitted the questions of national defense to become party issues.

The difference in method between Germany and the United States in gaining their purpose is one only of degree. By Germany, force is considered the proper instrument, but with us we prefer bluff! The United States possesses a great empire and has only to preserve it, while Germany must establish her economic independence and security of national supply. Germany was forced to resort to extreme militarism in order to achieve efficiency. Without that efficiency the German Empire would long ago have been destroyed. The United States, on the other hand, is inefficient in organized endeavor of government. Our republicanism has developed individualism and character, but has failed to provide us with unity as a nation.

It has been explained that a fleet is not only for the defense of the nation, but also is the force behind a policy believed to be essential to the growth of the nation. Therefore, those who control the policies of the nation must consult with the naval and military authorities in order to obtain their expert advice on the military strength required by the United States to maintain its policies, by war if need be. (A policy cannot be maintained through arbitration unless the nation is strong enough to enforce arbitration.¹) Arbitration plus force is a fact, but arbitration without force is a dream. Now the fault lies not only in that our statesmen seldom consult with the naval and military authorities, but in that, when they do obtain their advice, they refuse to accept it and, instead, advance their own opinions as to the country's preparedness, and act upon those opinions.

Since 1903 the general board of the navy, whose duty it is to study the fleets of foreign nations and recommend a naval programme to meet our international requirements, has advised the building of two dreadnaughts a year *as a minimum*. Failing to provide this minimum number for several consecutive years, four were advised. This latter advice has been given each secretary

¹ This was most emphatically proved in the case of the *Alabama* claims after our Civil War.

of the navy since 1910, but has never been accepted.¹ The result is that we have dropped from second place to third place, and this loss in ranking has been not only a material one, but also a moral one, for the personnel of our navy is to-day

¹ The general board, in 1904, was instructed to prepare a programme of construction that would assure the United States a navy adequate to present requirements and future possibilities. The board submitted its report and proceeded from year to year, in accordance with its instructions, to recommend the number of ships Congress should authorize in order to keep the actual construction up to the requirements of the policy formulated by the board.

The ships recommended to Congress from 1904 to 1914, inclusive, included all types from the biggest battleships to colliers. Congress put its "enlightened" civilian wisdom against the scientific knowledge of the highly trained members of the general board, and persistently cut down the number of ships asked for. How Congress has slighted the advice of the general board, and how Congress itself has known from year to year that it has been making a travesty of our naval construction policy, are shown by placing in tabular form the recommendations of the general board and the performances of Congress. The following table, covering the period 1904-7, is illustrative of the apathy of the people's representatives:

	1904 *	1905	1906	1907	Total 4 years
Total ships, all types, recommended by general board.....	15	27	23	20	85
Total authorized by Congress.....	14	2	12	3	31
Battleships asked for by board.....	2	3	3	2	10
Battleships authorized by Congress	1	2	1	1	5

This table shows that, in four years, the ships of all classes authorized by Congress were only a little more than a third of those recommended by the general board, or exactly 36 per cent, while the proportion of battleships authorized to those asked for was fifty per cent. In the decade, 1904-14, the general board recommended a total of 326 ships of all classes, and Congress authorized only 153, or 20 fewer than half. Each year the recommendations of the board

so inadequate that many of our fighting units are mere shams.¹

This lack of co-ordination between statesmanship and military force occurs on account of the absence of a responsible head of our government, and the shameful situation has continued because the people have been often kept in ignorance and have been taught their history only from highly colored accounts. There should be no doubt in the mind of any thinking man that there must be a definite responsibility for war preparedness.

In the last analysis it is the people who govern and the demands of the Navy Department have been discussed at congressional committee hearings which have been reported stenographically and republished in the newspapers. If the public has not been informed it is because the popular mind has been distracted from the consideration of the question of national defense by the claims of the peace enthusiasts that there would be no more war, and by the belief that Uncle Sam can "lick all creation," prepared or unprepared.

The navy has two great departments, that of material and that of personnel. The preceding table shows how Congress has responded to the urgings of the general board as to the property needed for the navy. On that all-important question of the personnel, one needs but to glance over the pages of the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute and other service publications to appreciate how thoroughly the shortcomings of the United States navy in the matter of personnel have already been set before the American people.

¹ "In addition to the number at present authorized by law, there are needed to complete the complements of all the ships at present on the Navy Register, 933 officers, and 18,556 men, while in 21 battle-ships in commission, and now composing the Atlantic fleet, there is a shortage of 5,219 men and 339 officers required to fill all stations necessary to efficiently fight the ships in battle." (Rear-Admiral F. F. Fletcher to the chairman of the House Naval Committee, January 14, 1915.)

ern, it is the people who must be informed of their military condition. The regulations which forbid military and naval men writing for publication for the purpose of discussion should be rewritten. The freest discussion on all military and naval topics by officers of both services should be encouraged, such writings to be signed by the authors, for which they would assume the entire responsibility. When this privilege has been given, then the people will have a means of getting at the truth, and the authority in each case will be known. Sealing the lips of those capable of giving the truth, we have encouraged scare-head articles upon our naval preparedness, which carry little weight and make no lasting impression upon the minds of the people.

If the recommendations of the general board of the navy since 1903 had been followed, the United States would now possess a naval force equal to that of any nation except England. The expense of construction and maintenance would have been spread over a number of years and would hardly have been felt. But now we are suffering from the accumulation of error. We find ourselves hopelessly short of battleships, battle cruisers, armored cruisers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries of all kinds. In the Caribbean, where, no doubt, will be waged our next naval war in the Atlantic, there has been

provided no suitable base from which the fleet can operate—the navy having been refused the development of its most vital base—Guantánamo Bay. Our army is too small to furnish the necessary troops to protect the Panama Canal, to man the defenses of Hawaii and the guns on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. The personnel of all of our coast fortifications on the Atlantic and the Pacific is at less than half strength. It is now possible to man only from one-third to one-half the guns of our coast fortifications with trained coast artillerymen. Our ammunition supply for the navy is now almost sufficient for war purposes. But, on the other hand, not a single United States battleship afloat to-day is equipped with modern long-range torpedoes, our mine defenses are inadequate in number, and our aeroplane service has been permitted to stand still for several years, while other nations have rapidly progressed.

Admiral Mahan often endeavored to force home to us the appreciations of political conditions as an essential factor in all military plans. "When Germany shall have finished the ships contemplated in the naval programme which she has formally adopted," he wrote, "she will have a navy much superior to that of the United States unless we change our present rate of building and also provide more extensive plants. Where, then, will be the Monroe Doctrine, and where the secur-

ity of the Panama Canal? The enforcement of both these depends upon the fleet." He then went on to show how "the superior fleet dominates if the margin of superiority be sufficient. It is the question of political relations which introduces perplexing factors; and the military adviser of a government is not competent to his task unless, by knowledge of conditions and practice in weighing them, he can fairly estimate how far inferior numbers may be reinforced by the pressure which other conditions may bring on a possible enemy. Every naval officer should order his study and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home, by the reflection that he may some day be on a general staff, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions."

There is much presented to us in the above paragraph for earnest reflection. How far do Germany's relations with other European states permit her embarking her fleet on a transatlantic adventure? If, perchance, Germany finds herself free after this war in Europe to send to the Caribbean a superior fleet, then our Monroe Doctrine will be put aside. In our long contention with England over the Monroe Doctrine, our progress was due, not to the size of our navy, which was ludicrously small, but, as Admiral Mahan said, to the political relations of England

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with other powers, which made it unwise for her to embark in a contest with the United States.

It does not take naval learning to conclude that the United States is too weak on the seas, that we require more battleships, more cruisers, more destroyers, more submarines, more auxiliaries, and more naval bases, and that we would also be wise to build a division of battle cruisers, which have not only the offensive power of modern battleships, but also the greatly higher speed essential to long-distance scouting.¹ Furthermore,

¹ When the battle cruiser first came into prominence in the foreign navies, our naval officers were quick to realize the importance of this new class of fighting craft, which is merely a development and improvement of the old type of armored cruiser. If the recommendations of the general board since 1904 had been followed by Congress, it would have been possible to build battle cruisers for our navy when the type first came out without imperiling our rank in battleship strength. But the refusal of Congress to listen to expert advice retarded the development of our fleet along the most advanced lines. As a result, the situation in which we find ourselves to-day is as follows: Our fastest battleship, the *Wyoming*, has a speed of 21.22 knots. Our fastest armored cruiser (carrying 10-inch guns) is the *North Carolina*, with a speed of 22.48 knots. But how completely outclassed both of these ships are by the corresponding capital ships of foreign navies is demonstrated in the following table:

Fastest Battle Type Ship	Type	Dis- place- ment Tons	Speed Knots	Armament
<i>Queen Mary</i> (England)...	Battle cruiser	27,000	35.7	8 13-inch
<i>Seydlitz</i> (Germany)	Battle cruiser	24,385	29.0	10 11-inch
<i>Kongo</i> (Japan)	Battle cruiser	27,500	28.0	8 14-inch
<i>Wyoming</i> (United States).	Battleship	26,000	21.22	12 12-inch
<i>North Carolina</i> (United States)	Armored cruiser	14,500	22.48	4 10-inch

and this is more important than any other single consideration, our navy must have units of trained men, and all the fighting ships of the fleet must be manned or else stricken from the list of available vessels for war.

We are told by naval experts that in case of hostilities the duty of the navy is to further military operations designed to bring hostilities to a speedy and favorable conclusion, and also to gain command of the sea in order that our commerce may continue as tranquilly as in times of peace. This control of the sea is not a concrete thing in itself. It does not assure every merchantman flying our flag safety from capture by the enemy's vessels. But it does assure a steady flow of commerce to and from our home ports. For the business of controlling the sea, the prime factor is a dominating force of capital ships, capable of moving swiftly and carrying with it sufficient power to dominate any disturbed locality of the ocean. Command of the sea gives the nation that has won it the power to interrupt at will the commerce of the enemy, to convoy, without undue risk, troops from the home country to the enemy's territory, and to deny the sea to the enemy's troop-ships. A nation at war will desire primarily to seek out, with its fleet, the enemy's squadrons for the purpose of destroying them. If the enemy refuses action and remains in its

own fortified bases, then it must be blockaded and prevented from interfering with commerce. It has often been shown that in all wars one fleet, the stronger, has endeavored to bring the other to action, while the latter has attempted to avoid action. If fleets were composed solely of battle-ships, then the commerce of each nation would remain safe until it came into the area controlled by the fleet of its enemy. In order to be able to keep the heavy fighting ships concentrated, nations have built cruisers of high speed for the purpose of preying upon the commerce of the enemy while their fighting ships are employed against the fighting ships of the enemy. By means of these cruisers, operating over vast areas of the sea, the nation possessing them has been able materially to affect the financial resources of its opponent, and eventually to force the enemy's battle fleet, in desperation, to give battle.

Upon the outbreak of the war in Europe, Germany had a number of fast cruisers on the high seas. While the German battle fleet lay bottled up in German ports, these corsairs roamed the ocean, playing havoc with the mighty commerce of Great Britain; but lacking bases and depending only upon their speed, they were, with one or two exceptions, soon rounded up and destroyed by the numerically stronger cruisers of the British fleet, which were sent out against them. And

now that the German cruisers have been practically annihilated, the control of the seas lies absolutely with the Allies, while the German merchant marine has been swept away. But cruisers of this type, designed for the purpose of preying on the enemy's commerce, may be said not to exist in our fleet. Nor have we the means of preventing depredations of the enemy's commerce destroyers, or the raids of his high-powered battle cruisers. There is not on the navy list of the United States to-day a single cruiser that could have overtaken the *Emden*.

Since the strategical advantage of being able to sweep the seas of the enemy's commerce is denied us, the small merchant marine that we have will fear to leave port while the enemy's cruisers are at large. We thus see that even with a superior fleet we would not be able to command the trade routes, except in the immediate vicinity of our battle fleet. Our merchandise in neutral bottoms might even be seized by the enemy's cruisers, and all merchandise bound to United States ports might be declared contraband and turned back by enemy's vessels after visit and search. We would then find ourselves in a very anomalous position: having a superior fleet yet forced to permit the weaker enemy to control the carrying trade routes. Therefore, can we not see that by refusing to keep pace with

probable enemies in fast vessels of the cruiser type, we are permitting any one to hold against us a distinct and valuable handicap? If, by chance, we operate at a distance from our base, it will be necessary for our fleet to depend upon shipments of coal, oil, and supplies from home. How, then, shall we be assured that these vessels carrying those things that our fleet so urgently needs, will reach the fleet safely? The answer is childishly simple. We cannot! They will be open to the raid of the enemy's fast cruisers, against which we are impotent. Our fleet may even find itself derelict for want of the necessities to its continued mobility. If we should endeavor to convoy our supplies, using battleships for the purpose, our navy would risk annihilation while so divided.

If, perchance, the nation takes its lesson from the war in Europe, and gives an impetus to the building of a merchant marine, our weakness in cruisers will become more manifest, and our loss during a war would be more disastrous. Thus, we see that our development of types has been based upon faulty conceptions of naval warfare. But even if the enemy were willing to do that which would be most advantageous to us in case we had a superior fleet, *i. e.*, to come out and fight us, then, once the decision being won, our battleships and other fighting units could be scattered

for the purpose of protecting our commerce, but we can hardly expect our enemy to be so obliging. He will do that which will inconvenience us most, and when war has begun we shall sorely regret our neglect of that class of vessel which alone can safeguard our commerce during the continuance of hostilities. Furthermore, the service of scouting by cruisers, although appearing auxiliary, is of capital importance. Our lack of scouts for the fleet places the navy in a position of manifest inferiority to a probable enemy. This omission will, in war, compel our fleet to act without definite information of the movements of the enemy's force.

We thus see that the control of the sea, in the case of a nation having no fast cruisers, is encompassed within the narrow area through which the battle fleet moves, while shipping upon the remainder of the ocean will lie vulnerable to attack by the enemy's fast cruisers. On the other hand, the submarine has had a meteoric entrance into publicity in the present war, which has thrown many of our citizens, most noticeably those in Congress, off their mental balance. They have argued that since a submarine may, under favorable circumstances, be able to sink a battleship, therefore the battleship is doomed, and should not be perpetuated. The same argument could as readily be applied to the mine, which is twice as

powerful as the torpedo. The submarine is a weapon of opportunity, as is the mine. We must not mistake the end for the means. The end is the control of the sea. Force must be opposed by force. The radius of activity of a submarine is limited. It is simply a projectile launched from a naval base, capable of operating to a limited distance; then it must return to that base. A battleship, or a cruiser, is a projectile of greater range. It may be fired for thousands of miles, and may roam and operate and destroy for weeks at a time. The battleship is the 14-inch shell, while the submarine is a missile of minor caliber. The submarine on the surface has no chance against a vessel armed with a gun, and while submerged its effective cruising radius is restricted. The evolution of the submarine is tending upward. Before many years we may see a submarine capable of accompanying the battleship fleet. It will be used in naval actions as is the destroyer. It will submerge to escape pursuit while the destroyer uses its speed. But battleships will remain the mistresses of the seas, and the nation having the greatest force of battleships will retain control of the seas. Those nations that read incorrectly the true evolution of types, and depart on eccentric missions, will find themselves left behind in the race for domination. We thus see the necessity for a well-rounded fleet. Each unit

has been evolved for its particular part in war. Our present unpreparedness in these essential auxiliaries will be difficult to correct, and the blame for these omissions will be as difficult to locate. The question, however, is not where has our maladministration led us, but do the American people desire to see continued a condition of affairs that will lead to certain disaster?

CHAPTER VII

MILITARY POLICY

MILITARY policy determines the preparation made by a nation in support of its international policy. Military policy is ambitious where the nation's diplomacy is ambitious. It naturally receives its impetus through the necessities of the nation. A nation having nothing to lose need have no military policy. A nation having much to lose requires a strong and consistent policy. But a strong military policy does not necessarily mean militarism. It means simply that the nation will systematically cultivate its muscles and strengthen the moral tone of its structure. It assures that the treaties in which the nation has entered will be enforced.

The peculiar position of our country is such that the best and most efficient security is offered by building up the military spirit among its citizens. The protection of his home is a fundamental instinct of the male, but in these days such protection for a nation can be accomplished only through organization. A million men without organization are of very little use. An assem-

blage of men untrained, undisciplined, and without leaders is nothing more nor less than a crowd or a mob. We all know that a crowd does not reason, and that it is not influenced by argument. Its imagination is very active. It is susceptible of being powerfully aroused. A crowd may, therefore, be quickly thrown into a panic. Being incapable of reflection and of reasoning, it cannot understand what is improbable, and the improbable things are the most striking. But when, on the other hand, a crowd has once been disciplined and is well led, then it becomes a powerful force. No one would compare the consciousness of a mob to that of a brigade of soldiers drawn up on the parade-ground for a review. In the first, there is no idea in common, no underlying, co-ordinating force; it is simply unreasoning, and when aroused it knows no extremes of action and is susceptible to all kinds of influences. But the soldiers are held together by a common idea and can be controlled by the will of a leader.

It has been said that "a people is an organism created by the past, which, like every organism, can only modify itself by slow, hereditary accumulations. Without tradition there is neither national soul nor civilization possible. Hence the two great occupations of man since his existence have been to create for himself a system of traditions, and then to try to destroy them when

their beneficial effects have been exhausted. Without the traditions, no civilization. Without the destruction of these traditions, no progress."

Traditions represent the ideas, the needs, the sentiments of the past. They are the synthesis of the race, and bear down upon us with all their weight. The national traditions that cause the maintenance of a weak military policy are traditions that must be destroyed, for they are now a danger to us. But the question is, how can they be destroyed? They cannot be destroyed by law or by the issue of decrees. Nations are governed by their genius, and all institutions which are not ultimately moulded on this genius represent but a transitory disguise. Institutions cannot remedy the defects in our national genius, and national progress will not come through perfecting our institutions.

Instruction and education will in time remove false traditions that should be destroyed, but this process is slow. A generation or more will be required before dangerous beliefs can be erased from the national mind. Unfortunately, military institutions are not in harmony with the genius of our people, and until they become so the attempt to make the nation a strong one will fail. Even though this be true, the seed must be planted, while time alone can produce the flowering tree.

Socialism has for one of its objects the elevation of the masses. Its ideal is to accomplish universal happiness among a people. It undertakes to feed the hungry, to shelter the homeless, and to drag down the plutocrat to a befitting level. Universal military service, if accepted as a fundamental duty, will, in effect, partially accomplish socialism. Military training cannot fail to elevate the masses, to make them capable of earning a living wage, and to provide suitable occupations for every citizen of the nation. Military training will make the citizen more efficient, in forcing him to see the necessity for an aim in life, in showing him that organization and co-ordination among his fellow men is a fundamental necessity in the progress of the community and of the nation. It will teach him efficiency in methods of doing work and, above all, will give him an ideal of honor and honesty without which a man can be nothing but a waif.

A nation whose citizens have been trained in military pursuits will of itself discard those political shams of government where the community is ruled and robbed by the "boss" politician. The offices in our government service, instead of being filled through favor by these same politicians to work their own selfish ends, would be filled, as they are in France and England, by men who had served their country faithfully as soldiers and were ready at their country's call to re-

turn again to the active duties in which they had been trained.

Even now, with a small army and navy, those men who have gone out of the services find no difficulty in obtaining positions of trust and advantage. They are sought after by the great commercial companies, by the railroads, by the fire departments and police departments because they are recognized to be efficient, self-respecting, and trustworthy. When these men compete in civil life with those who have not had the military training the contrast is striking. Universal military service will give every citizen this necessary postgraduate course to fit him to take his place in an orderly and well-organized community.

The faults of our military policy have been caused primarily by a faulty conception in our organization of government. When our ancestors framed our Constitution they feared to place too much authority in the hands of one man or one body of men. They thought that liberty would be conserved better by a divided authority. The President, the legislature, and the judiciary are therefore coequal. Between the two former the responsibility of a lack of a continuous military policy rests. The President may be in favor of a strong military policy, and he has the opportunity in his annual message to Congress, or through special messages, of expressing his views,

yet the legislature may not agree with the opinions of the chief magistrate. Congress reflects the will of the people. Congress can go no faster than the people. When the country knows and speaks its mind, Congress will not fail to act; but its act will be a tardy one, for time is required for such a body of men to be convinced that they have heard aright.

Our legislature, therefore, follows the people; it does not lead them. Congress holds the purse-strings, and, being responsible by law for the money allotted, naturally desires accurate and comprehensive statistics as to how the money is to be spent. Congress or the committees of Congress having jurisdiction over a particular appropriation bill, feel that the entire responsibility and authority belongs to them. Congress is too large to work as a unit. In order to accomplish results it has been forced to divide itself into innumerable committees that handle the appropriations for government service. A new appropriation bill is built up on the structure of the one of the year previous. Many items of the bill are repeated from year to year; others are new items. An appropriation bill for one of the great military services, carrying over a hundred millions of dollars, contains as many as three hundred separate items, each with a definite amount of money to be spent on that item alone before the

end of the fiscal year, and if not spent that money returns to the treasury. In many of the items of an appropriation bill, framed in a committee of Congress, congressmen may have more than a political or national interest. Much of this money is to be spent in their own congressional districts. They have fathered such of these items and have insisted, maybe, against the sound technical advice of military men, that these items remain in the bill, threatening, if they should be removed, that their vote would be cast against items in the bill that are more vital to the welfare of the nation. Some of the congressmen may have been influenced by business men who are financially interested in certain items which are being opposed as unwise and unnecessary by the technical officers of the army or navy. These congressmen are not necessarily dishonest. They may have been convinced by the fluent and persuasive manufacturers' lobbyists that what they have to sell is absolutely necessary for the welfare of the country. The consequent result of this quality of legislation is to give the army and navy only a part of the things they need and a great many things that they have no use for at all. Economy is sacrificed and for these unnecessary items the government spends its money. Army posts, which should have been abandoned long ago, lying within the district of politically powerful

congressmen, receive large money appropriations yearly for up-keep and even for extensions after the general staff of the army have advised their abandonment. Needless navy-yards are kept open and large sums of money are annually spent on them, when the general board has year after year advised their closing for the sake of economy and efficiency. And this, not because Congress believed they were more competent to decide than the naval experts, but because their own interests, no doubt, often swayed their judgment.

If the matter were not so serious, it would be ludicrous to see our Naval Committee, after taking testimony from all the professional sources at their command, in the end allow party affiliations, as it would seem, to control their decision. Fortunately thus far, Congress, while reducing the recommendations of the General Board of the Navy, has not radically departed from them, but it is easily within its power, if party politics require it, to disregard altogether the labors of that intelligent body and substitute for their expert recommendations those evolved in the committee discussions.

The committee of Congress calls before it the heads of the executive departments, the secretary of war, the secretary of the navy, the chiefs of bureaus in the departments, the chief of staff of the army, commandants of navy-yards, etc., and

puts each through a course of questions which form very interesting reading and are, in some cases, very instructive. The method of the committee is good. The result should be to get the facts and be sure the money is appropriated wisely. But, unfortunately, each witness before the committee too often endeavors to obtain for his particular office the maximum of funds, for the greatest power is wielded by the official having the largest appropriation for his bureau or office. The secretary of war and the secretary of the navy are undoubtedly honest in their intentions, as are all the officers called before the committee, but their opinions are one-sided and never, by any chance, co-ordinate. The method is one of competition between departments and bureaus; each witness is an advocate of his own supposed needs, without first fitting those needs to the requirements of the service as a whole. Their opinions betray the lack of a co-ordinating military education. A reading of the hearings before a committee of Congress reveals the startling fact that no one has a real conception of the basic purpose and use of the army and navy. The desire actuating each of them is to obtain enough money to get through the following year, not to make the army and navy efficient for the purpose of defending the country. There is no one military individual, except the chief of staff

of the army, who has knowledge comprehensive enough at his disposal to bring the point of military efficiency clearly to view. The chief of staff of the army is the responsible military head of the army. He has under him a body of trained officers whose study is entirely along the lines of military efficiency. Unfortunately for him, he is the head of no financial bureau and, in consequence, as a witness before the congressional military committee his testimony is not received with enthusiasm. But he is a thorn in the side of the military committee. He gives them facts which they cannot refute. He puts his fingers on weak spots in the appropriation bills. He shows where money, which should be used for the defense of the nation, is being wasted. His co-workers discover the many tricks and military flaws in the appropriation bill, and he endeavors to have them removed. In Elihu Root the army most fortunately had a secretary of war influential enough to obtain for that branch of the service the legal establishment of a general staff. Its creation somewhat weakened the prestige and power of the military committee. The congressional committee cannot stand up against its organized technical knowledge. But though there are often good business men on that committee, they know little of the military needs of the army, and they cannot therefore understand why, if a large amount of

money is spent on the army and navy, the consequence is not efficiency. Congress, through its committees, has not been able to realize that legislative control over executive action has disastrous results. Congress, jealous of its powers, fears to give due weight to military opinions and prefers its own judgment to the advice of men who have given the subject a life's study.¹

¹ See Appendix III.

CHAPTER VIII.

NAVAL POLICY

THE officers of our navy for years have realized the desirability, amounting to a necessity, of a general staff for the navy. They do not doubt the honesty, integrity, and earnestness of the secretary of the navy, nor the willingness of Congress to have an efficient navy, but they see that, unless there exists a technical authority in control of naval progress, with adequate responsibility, great sums of money will continue to be spent without gaining efficiency for the navy.

Under our statutes, the head of the navy is the secretary of the navy, who has full authority and no division of responsibility. He is the commander of the navy, under the President, his superior, who may control his action, as may Congress by law; but this, as far as it goes, is merely a transfer of responsibility in its entirety. The secretary of the navy has no associates, he has only subordinates. In them he has capable advisers, so far as he chooses to use them, but they are not legally constituted advisers, and there is

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in their position nothing which compels the secretary to hear their advice, still less to accept it. Unity of action between the several naval technical experts is not provided for by law. The military efficiency of our navy depends, then, entirely upon the co-ordinating force of the secretary, who is a civilian. What may result from this vital defect in our system of naval administration is not pleasant to consider. The secretary of the navy, believing his authority and responsibility to be unlimited, can dive down into the very bowels of a battleship and make a change in policy or reverse the time-honored traditions of the service. The range of his arm is unlimited; against its strength the navy has no redress; the entire efficiency of the fleet for battle may be upset and rendered futile by one stroke of his pen.

A fleet, with all that goes with it, has a reason for its existence. That reason is not for show, or to make a spectacular display, or to give work to labor unions at navy-yards, or to build up a political reputation, or to gain votes for senators and congressmen; it is for the purpose of engaging in battle with the fleet of that enemy which may challenge us in our struggle for national existence. That enemy stands between our fleet and life. Our congressmen and secretaries can appreciate the necessity of team-work in a baseball nine, and yet—it seems incredible—they do

not appear to see the necessity of team-work for the fleet, which plays a far more important game—the game of war. A defeat on the diamond results only in hurt feelings, in a transient sadness among the team and its supporters. The fleet's defeat means the loss of thousands of lives, of millions of dollars in money, of the nation's honor. The up-keep and the training of the fleet for battle cannot be done alone by the commanders of the fleet. They can do their mortal best, but without the wise support of the Navy Department and Congress, the fleet is foredoomed to destruction. No one of either service desires to change the Constitution. But the great war in Europe has opened their eyes even wider, and shown them the brink upon which the army and navy stand—brought to this crucial situation by despotic civilian control over our military policies. The blame for this rests not with individuals, but in the faulty conceptions held by those who overstep and override military advice on military matters.

In the next year we shall see a sudden awakening throughout the land. Our hopes are always for peace. Our ideals are humanitarian. Our desire is to continue quietly on the path of our policies. We have no wish to acquire more territory, nor do we desire aught but our share in the commerce of the world. We have seen that

to gain these ends we must keep the nation from becoming obese and flabby. The muscles in our arms must not get soft. Those who are crying out against armaments and militarism, and persuading us to put our trust in treaties, will be disregarded. Weak statesmen may attempt to undermine such legislation, which they fear may upset their calculation for peace, but the good judgment of the intelligent citizens should resist the attempt, and see to it that our traditional national policies are given the military support which alone can perpetuate them. The United States can never permit a hostile Asiatic or European force to land on the soil of this continent for the permanent acquisition of territory. Once a military nation gains a foothold, then, history tells us, its tenure is a long one. If Germany should defeat the British fleet and the allied armies, and turn its attention upon Canada, our fleet must bar the way. Nor can we permit a military nation to land a force on this continent for the purpose of chastising a Central or South American republic. Our safety lies in thwarting the attempt. Once the military occupation is an accomplished fact, we may find ourselves incapable, like China, of persuading that military nation to evacuate. This is not a question of international law, but one of self-defense.

That our navy is, to-day, not efficient for war

with a first-class power is no longer a secret. If Congress is satisfied that we must look to the fleet primarily to provide national defense, and is seriously anxious to economize the nation's money in order that not a cent shall be spent that does not increase the fleet's efficiency, is it not then the duty of Congress to see that these intentions are made good? A congressional function is to audit expenditures upon which our national credit is based; why, then, is it not its duty to audit the fleet, upon which our national existence is based? Unfortunately, Congress has difficulty in correctly auditing the fleet. Military and naval officers are held strictly to secrecy by departmental regulations.¹ They must make their protests and criticisms to the department. But the Navy Department resents these criticisms, seemingly believing that they reflect upon the work of the department. It is perfectly evident, then, that the navy cannot improve, cannot gain efficiency as long as such methods are enforced. In all democratic countries the greatest progress is gained through publicity and discussion during peace. Until war approaches, secrecy, as a policy, is disastrous, and for this the reason is clear, because in our country the people govern. By maintaining secrecy, the rulers—the people—

¹ This secrecy, imposed in times of peace, only prevents our own citizens from knowing what the military authorities of other countries already know through other channels.

are kept in ignorance of the real efficiency of the fleet and of the readiness of their country for war. Once Congress is told that the fleet is inefficient, that the army is inadequate, and that our vaunted safety is a myth, and once this knowledge is frankly admitted to the people through the press, then the people will supply the remedy. No great government organization can achieve efficiency through internal development alone. Such development takes no account of environment; it takes no account of difficulties to be overcome; it takes no account of an enemy to be encountered. Government administration will achieve results only when there exists a force jealous and antagonistic, and compelling it to be efficient, and this force must be outside of the control of the administration. If the country were aware of a menace—a military nation armed and ready to strike them—then the force compelling efficiency would be supplied; but without this open menace to the safety of the country, free and open discussion upon our readiness for war is the only solution.

Even blunders in the handling of the fleet should be given out to the nation, in order that the people can judge the competency of its leaders. Certain British admirals who were executed for misconduct, disloyalty, and want of courage during the eighteenth-century wars were, we are told, not culpable. Their dereliction was due to

an insufficient acquaintance with the methods and principles of the tactics of that day and to the defective signalling systems of that age. In this country we prevent the public from hearing of our tactical blunders, and severely censure those who publicly discuss them. How much wiser it would be to thrash the whole matter out in free discussion, and decide then whether these mistakes and the general lack of readiness for battle is not due to insufficient acquaintance with the methods and principles of the tactics of this day.

The unreadiness of the navy for war can be laid at the door of the faulty conceptions of responsibility in organization and administration. Whom will the country hold responsible if our fleet is defeated? The statesmen of the nation who have failed to provide an adequate force? Or the secretary of the navy for not preparing what was given him for battle? Will the chiefs of the several bureaus in the Navy Department be held responsible for not providing the fleet with those necessities which are essential to its preparedness? Or will the commander-in-chief of the fleet be held responsible for not having brought his fleet up to the highest state of efficiency for battle?

Can we not see that there must be some one made responsible for the war efficiency of our navy? Can we not appreciate that, by dividing the responsibility among many, individual

responsibility is sacrificed and successful results are, in consequence, impossible? The *raison d'être* of the navy is to afford protection to our shores from invasion by engaging the enemy's fleet. This duty is essentially a military one, and to intrust a civilian, an untrained man, with this, the military direction, is contrary to all principles of administration, military or business. By the fleet is meant the *War Fleet*, and not the peace fleets under their several commanders-in-chief.

The secretary of the navy has a duty to perform, but it is a civil duty. It concerns the provision and preparation of a naval force for the purposes of state. He should bring to this duty a thorough business capacity, and for the exercise of the great function of which he is the head, he must surround himself with responsible men to control the different activities. His principal manager should be a man chosen for his wide knowledge of military affairs. In him the secretary should repose the most absolute confidence. He must be the chief military adviser to the secretary. His decisions on military subjects must be taken unless they conflict with the higher decisions of the state of which the secretary alone is the judge. In the civil duties under the secretary, managers would also have to be appointed. These managers should be technical men, and they likewise should be the secretary's advisers in their own special fields. The military manager

will perform the duties of a chief of the general staff of the navy, and in his office will be collected a trained personnel with the military wisdom required to place the navy on a sound military footing, and make it ready for future campaigns in case war should come.

It is evident to any student of government administration that efficiency is impossible in our army and navy, and still less in our Department of State, without a still higher co-ordinating authority. Such authority in other countries is called "The National Defense Board," "The Board of National Defense," or "The Elder Statesmen." An agitation for such an authority was made in this country several years ago under the title of "A Council for National Defense." The duties of such a council, composed of the President, the secretaries of state, war, and navy, the chairmen of the financial committees of Congress, the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military and naval affairs, the presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges, and the chief of staff of the army and an officer of the navy—all representative men of intelligence, of knowledge, and of prestige, selected, as it were, irrespective of internal politics—would be for the purpose of providing sufficient military power to accomplish the purposes of the nation.

The Council for National Defense would supply the authority to whom the people of the nation

could always appeal. This council would assume entire responsibility for the country's safety. The assumption of such a responsibility would demand, first, a military organization for both the army and navy. Its powerful influence would be felt by Congress. All attempts to deflect money for defense into less useful channels would be barred. The Council for National Defense would assure itself that, in the event of war, plans had been prepared beforehand to wage the war. It would assure itself that the military organization and the naval organization were thoroughly competent to carry on the administration of the army and navy under the dislocating effects of war. It would furnish the driving force which does not now exist, compelling the War Department and the Navy Department to organize themselves for the business of waging war. In the creation of such an organization for war, the necessity of a military head of each organization, the army and navy, would be apparent. The Council for National Defense would exact responsibility from the chiefs of the general staffs, the military heads of the army and the navy. These chiefs would surround themselves with men who are capable of setting before them all the facts of the military system under their control—experts in the art of war.

At present, for the navy there exists the gen-

eral board, which each year submits to the secretary of the navy the number of ships and the types which, in its judgment, should be built. The board's recommendations are based upon a comprehensive study of probable opponents, and is usually a minimum for the needs of the country.¹ Such a report has been submitted for the last ten years, but in no one year has more than one-half of the board's recommendation been accepted by Congress, or even by the secretary of the navy! The board is not legalized by statute, and its findings can, therefore, be disregarded, as they generally are, if "not agreeable." The consequence has been that, while ten years ago the navy of the United States was second in strength among the great fleets of the world, it has slowly but surely dropped from that position.

The following table will show the results of our unwise naval programme:

ANNUAL DREADNAUGHT STRENGTH

	Germany	Great Britain	United States
1912.....	11	18	6
1913.....	16	26	8
1914.....	20	32	10
1915.....	23	36	12
1916.....	26	41	14
1917.....	28	45	16
1918.....	30	49	18
1919.....	33	53	20
1920.....	35	57	22

¹ See Appendix I.

This table includes dreadnaughts only, for the older ships are fast becoming of secondary importance, and it is based upon the known naval policies of Germany and Great Britain since 1912 and, for the United States, upon the policy of two dreadnaughts a year, which as yet has *not* been continuously followed. It will therefore be seen that in 1915, this year, Germany will have almost double the number of dreadnaughts in our fleet, while Great Britain will have thrice the number. Japan, on the other hand, in 1915, when her four great battle cruisers are completed and her new dreadnaughts have joined her fleet, will have in dreadnaught strength a force equal to our own.

It has been pointed out, and the present war in Europe has demonstrated the point, that the nation which can force its enemy to seek it out in waters near its great naval bases will have all the advantage of submarine craft and torpedo craft that the enemy will be denied. Our great fleet, waging a war in the Orient against Japan, would suffer casualties from the submarines' torpedoes, and the loss of a few dreadnaughts would quickly reduce our fleet to one of inferiority. The United States has that advantage over Germany, but to provide for such casualties Germany has built twice the fleet of the United States. We can, therefore, readily see that a naval war

against Japan requires a force sufficient to accept all the hazards of the Japanese submarine operating in home waters.

All these questions that have been so lightly and quickly passed upon by our civilian legislators are vital to the nation's welfare. It is time that the nation appreciated its dangers and demanded a reorganization in the administration of its services of defense.

Let us keep clearly in mind the fundamental fact that the creation and control of the army and navy are duties that should be intrusted to men trained for the task; that the control of such specialties by inexperienced statesmen or politicians can only lead to discouragement and inefficiency, and furthermore, that congressional action taken against competent military advice fritters away the nation's money. The demoralization in our military organization is of such long standing that it is doubtful whether the evil can be remedied at once, for the organization of our naval administration is built upon so unstable a foundation that it insures nothing but prodigality of expenditures and wastefulness.

It is interesting to follow the development of our navy as shown in its annual appropriations for new construction. The following tables, prepared from congressional sources since the begin-

ning of the new navy in 1883, are suggestive. They reveal a glaring absence of definite or continuous policy.

TABLE I
CAPITAL SHIPS

YEAR	BATTLESHIPS			CRUISERS		
	Num- ber	Average Tonnage	Average Speed	Num- ber	Average Tonnage	Average Speed
1883.....	3	3,500	16
1884.....
1885.....	2	3,701	18
1886.....	2	6,498	17	1	4,413	20
1887.....	2	4,246	19
1888.....	7	3,799	19
1889.....
1890.....	3	10,288	16	1	7,350	22
1891.....	1	7,350	23
1892.....	1	11,346	17	1	9,215	21
1893.....
1894.....
1895.....	2	11,520	16
1896.....	3	11,552	17
1897.....
1898.....	3	12,500	18
1899.....	3	14,948	19	9	6,600	18
1900.....	2	14,948	19	6	11,690	22
1901.....
1902.....	2	16,000	18	2	14,500	..
1903.....	5	14,800	17
1904.....	1	16,000	18	5	8,030	24
1905.....	2	16,000	18
1906.....	1	20,000	21
1907.....	1	20,000	21
1908.....	2	21,825	21
1909.....	2	26,000	21
1910.....	2	27,000	21
1911.....	2	27,500	20
1912.....	1	31,400	21
1913.....	1	31,400	21
1914.....	3 ¹	32,000	21

¹Including the ship being constructed with the proceeds of the sale to Greece of the old battleships *Idaho* and *Mississippi*.

TABLE II
TORPEDO CRAFT

YEAR	TORPEDO-BOATS AND DESTROYERS			SUB-MARINES
	Number	Average Tonnage	Average Speed	Number
1886.....	1	105	22	..
1887.....
1888.....
1889.....
1890.....	1	120	24	..
1891.....
1892.....
1893.....	1
1894.....	2	142	24	..
1895.....	3	180	28	..
1896.....	10	120	24	..
1897.....	3	291	28	..
1898.....	24	370	28	..
1899.....
1900.....	7
1901.....
1902.....
1903.....
1904.....	4
1905.....
1906.....	3	700	28	8
1907.....	2	700	30	..
1908.....	10	742	30	8
1909.....	5	742	30	4
1910.....	6	742	30	4
1911.....	8	1,030	29	4
1912.....	6	1,050	29	8
1913.....	6	1,105	29	4
1914.....	6	1,110	29	8

The above tables have been grouped under the heads of (1) vessels whose main armament is the gun and (2) those whose main offensive weapon is the torpedo. They present the number of ships authorized in each session of Congress, the total tonnage appropriated for, and the aver-

age tonnage and speed for the vessels of both classes from 1883 to the present time. It will be seen that the building policy was vacillating, both as to numbers and as to types. In 1886 modern armored ships first came into favor. In 1888 the first armored cruiser was laid down, and in 1890 the first first-class battleship was built. In 1891 only a scout cruiser was built, then in 1895 two battleships were laid down. From that time on three battleships were built each year, except in 1897, when none was authorized. The year of the Spanish-American War, the monitor type again was favored. Then, in 1899, we undertook the building of large armored cruisers. The year following, the same was continued. Two and three battleships a year were built between 1902 and 1904. Then from 1904 on, two battleships each year were built until 1912 and 1913, when only one was appropriated for.

A study of our national policy during these years shows no marked change, yet in our naval-construction programme, in the number of ships built and in their tonnage, there was no progressive spirit. In design we followed other nations, principally England. But after developing a type of ship, a long time was wasted before the type was repeated and improved upon. In fact it may be seen that we retrograded during certain years. It will be noted that no armored cruisers of high

speed and offensive power were laid down after 1904, nor have we added a single scout cruiser to our fleet since that year.

Turning to the torpedo craft, we see that we began the construction of torpedo-boats as early as 1886, a few at a time, and by 1898, had evolved a vessel of nearly 300 tons, displacement. In that same year, the destroyer came suddenly into favor. Immediately following the Spanish-American War, Congress followed a creditably ambitious programme, making amends, apparently, for its lapses during the preceding years. But, after laying down a large number of these vessels in 1898, our representatives refused to appropriate for torpedo craft until 1906, when they began again to authorize a few at a time. This second impetus was given by the Russo-Japanese War. Since then the building has been more or less progressive. In one year, 1908, ten were laid down; in the remaining years, down to 1913, half a dozen were authorized at each session.

Now for the submarine. The first submarines built for our navy were what is known as the "A" type. They had a tonnage of about 60 tons, and seven of them altogether were built. Then the tonnage in the "B" type was increased to about 125 tons. In the "C" type we developed craft of about 200 tons; the "D" type were of 280 tons; the "E" type, about 300; the "F" type,

about 310; and so on up to the present "K" and "L" types, which are vessels of about 500 tons. Class for class, these under-water craft are considered the equal of those in foreign navies. But their evolution, in our case, has not been satisfactorily progressive. For the boats may be said to have been, in practically every case, experimental, since each class has been authorized and built before the previous one had been thoroughly tested and perfected.

Since the general board came into existence in March, 1900, it has endeavored to guide the building policy of our navy. Its effort has not been entirely successful. Yet, if this able body of men had not existed, we should undoubtedly have been in a very much more precarious state of preparation at this date. But, what has been a serious omission during these years of advance in construction, the personnel, both officers and men, was not increased in proportion to the new tonnage commissioned, and this error has greatly impaired the navy's efficiency.

It can readily be seen that the root of the trouble has been our lack of policy. A continuing policy, in construction and in the increase of personnel to keep up with the construction, can only be obtained through a continuing body of military thinkers. Congress must make use of organized military knowledge, such as can be

given only by a general staff. Sound doctrine of military policy is also required. This can be secured only through a council for national defense.

CHAPTER IX

NAVAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

ADMIRAL MAHAN said: "The test of a system of naval administration is its capacity—inherent, not spasmodic—to keep the establishment of the navy abreast of the best professional opinion concerning contemporary necessities, both in quality and quantity. It needs not only to know and to have what is best to-day, but to embody an organic provision for watching and forecasting to a reasonable future what will be demanded. This may not be trusted to voluntary action or to individual initiative. There is needed a constituted organ to receive, digest, and then officially to state, in virtue of its recognized office, what the highest instructed professional opinion, the opinion of the sea officers, holds concerning the needs of the navy at the moment and for the future, as far as present progress indicates. There is in the naval administration, as constituted by law, no organized provision to do the evolutionary work, the sifting process, by which in civil life the rough fight-

ing test of supply and demand, of competition in open market, and free usage pronounces decisively upon the practical merits of various instruments or methods of manufacture. The body of sea officers, the workmen of the navy, receive for use instruments upon which the system provides them no means of expressing the professional opinion as to their adaptability, relatively, to service conditions or to other existing instruments. Whatever harm may result from this falls not upon the workmen only, but upon those also for whom the work is done; that is, the nation." This, from our most illustrious thinker, is an open plea for a naval general staff.

The present system of independent bureaus of the Navy Department has now been in operation for over seventy years. It is a machine, designed and constructed in 1842, but never properly put together as a complete whole. It is an assemblage of parts which, since their first performance in the days of sail, have been oiled and urged until they have developed far beyond their original designed efficiency. And to-day the old parts still move in grooves, converging, diverging, or running parallel, as each part sees fit to cut its furrow. But within this machinery there exists neither motive force nor directive impulse. These are factors of active life that must come solely from without.

The navy has been efficient under certain secretaries and has had a relapse under others. Is it right, is it just to the nation, that such an important department of the government should fail to contain within itself the principle of continuous efficiency and be dependent upon chance for an individual to awaken it from inaction? Other departments of government are represented in the continuous interest of civil life, constituting an impulse more or less abiding to keep them abreast of the times. The navy and army have no such interest, and a secretary, a civilian, is not sufficient. As Mr. Meyer wrote in 1909: "In the past seven years there have been six secretaries of the navy." How may a civilian, lacking expert knowledge, under such circumstances adequately direct all the varied operations of the naval service? The continuous interest, spoken of above, must be supplied. It must be something subordinate to the secretary, embodying the progressive service ideas, touching the public and the administration ashore and afloat. This is a chief of the general staff and his general staff. This Admiral Mahan referred to when he said: "To supply the defect inherent in temporary tenure and periodical change, there is required for the Navy Department a tradition of policy analogous in fact to the principles of a political party, which are continuous in tradition, though

progressive in modification. These run side by side with the policy of particular administrations; not affecting their constitutional powers, but guiding general lines of action by an influence, the benefit of which, through the assurance of continuity, is universally admitted."

Organization and system are effective in controlling large operations that are beyond the grasp of the individual. System is the method by which organization works to secure desired results and to maintain control of every item of work in hand at all times. But system will be lacking in the Navy Department until we accept and act in accordance with the principles of organization. Organization implies forethought and preparation; we cannot, therefore, continue our unsystematized methods. The world has become too scientific. Other nations have reorganized, realizing that organization wins battles, and they have, in consequence, become more efficient. Organization for war means thorough and sound preparation for war in all its branches, from the higher command to every source of supply.

Unfortunately for the United States, the misconception and jealousy of our politicians have prevented the navy from gaining the organization which it knows it must have if the fleet is to be effective in war. A Council for National Defense,

being higher than the political party in power, could not be controlled by politics. It is therefore resisted by both political parties. And the creation of a naval general staff, established by law to supply the country with a continuous and progressive naval policy, is likewise refused by Congress.

While the appropriations for the navy have greatly increased during the past generation, unfortunately for the navy and for the nation, all this capital has not been usefully invested for the purposes of the navy. Some of this money has been spent and is being spent in localities and for purposes which cannot possibly increase the battle efficiency of the fleet. In perusing the various items of each annual appropriation we must bear in mind that capital is not the physical thing enumerated. It is the value represented by them. The value, rather than the physical thing, is what must be accounted for. As an example: a naval mobilization represents the physical thing, but of its value what do we know? If the service is highly trained for war and prepared to give battle, then the value of that mobilization is high. But if it is a mere assemblage of ships, inadequately manned, and furnished with ineffective and inefficient material, then its value is small, although the capital represented may be great.

The administration of the Navy Department, then, consists not merely in building ships, in buying material, in repairing vessels, in supplying a personnel, in educating the enlisted men, or in developing our navy-yards; it is the co-ordinating of all these duties and their welding into an effective instrument of war. The responsibility for the efficiency of that instrument of war cannot, therefore, be divided. Each separate activity must be thoroughly controlled and made to co-operate toward the ultimate object of developing the battle efficiency of the fleet.

We saw how, in 1898, on the outbreak of the war with Spain, the Navy Department, finding itself without a military board of strategy, and realizing the urgent need of a regular and continuing policy in face of the emergency, was forced to supply those parts of its organization which in time of peace it had refused to create. But such a desperate course, adopted on the outbreak of hostilities with a nation well organized and well prepared, may not again result so happily.

If we could keep clearly in mind the fundamental reason for the existence of the navy, and apply this aim to all our efforts, confusion would be partially if not wholly eliminated. The men who fight the ships must control the civil output.

In the great dockyards the same principle of control should obtain. Whether a navy-yard is

in charge of a naval officer or a civilian manager, the output of that yard should conform to the requirements and standards set by the men who will use the ships and the material in those ships. For, when the military man loses control over the sources of supply vital to his needs, then efficiency vanishes and the navy decays.

It is this definition of the word "control" that has, perhaps more than any other phrase, aroused discussion in the service. It is claimed by some professional writers that the line officers, they who will fight the ships, should entirely "control" the output. This does not mean that officers of the line should interfere with the work of the technical branches, but that they should pass on the value of the finished articles. Their training in the handling at sea of those articles often gives them the knowledge and the right to say whether the ships or the articles furnished them are not suited to the purpose. It is then the duty of the technical branches to endeavor to shape their specialties in order to comply with that decision. A ship is an instrument of war, and must be fashioned to do certain things. If the officers who use the ships find that they will not do the things required of them, then the technical officers must strive to alter them in order that they may accomplish the purpose for which they were designed. The officers who fight the ships must

not invade the sanctum of the technical branches. A choice of methods belongs to the technical branches, but this choice is one of interest only to the fighting officers. In preparing for war, and in war, time is an important element. Time is, therefore, a function of military preparedness, and the civil and technical branches must endeavor to co-ordinate their methods in order that the advantage gained through the time element can be assured. We have already seen how the statesmen control the use of the military forces in peace and war, while the method of control belongs to the military. Does not this same analogy hold good between the military officers who fight the ships and the civil and technical officers who supply and repair the ships? The line officer controls the use of the ships, but the designing and construction of those ships for their use belongs to those who have made the necessary specialties their life study. If, in an organization, the civil and technical branches become so strong and so powerful as to disregard the fundamental law of military control, then we shall find that the articles furnished will not be suited to the military uses.

The army is rapidly educating its officers in the art of war at the Army War College. This co-ordinating education will, in time, bring cohesion to the entire military service and make correct

reasoning a universal attribute among the officers themselves. The Naval War College¹ is attempting the same work, but its facilities are inadequate, and the officers allowed to attend the course are too few for the benefits of that education to be felt for some time to come. Until the entire navy, both line and staff, have been indoctrinated in the true principles of war and war preparedness, we cannot expect efficiency for the navy. So long as our naval officers are unable to grasp clearly a uniform point of view to which all individual efforts must subordinate themselves, harmony cannot be achieved. Our civilian secretaries and our congressmen of the naval committees complain that they do not always receive harmonious recommendations from the officers of the naval service. The education in the art of war of the naval officer has only begun. Strange as it may seem, the majority of the naval officers

¹ The Naval War College is *educational, not executive*. It is not a war board, nor a naval general staff. It forms no part of the working organization of the Navy Department, but supplies the material wherewith to construct such an organization. It devotes itself to the study of naval history, naval strategy and tactics, the law of nations, and academic discussions of all conceivable types of naval problems of war; it supplies the alumni from which to select officers competent to command our fleets, as well as those able to solve correctly the *actual* problems with which a naval general staff is bound to be confronted, a duty — generally of a nature so confidential as to prevent its being delegated elsewhere — which should be the sole function of a board sufficiently strong and able to constitute, both in peace and in war, the backbone of the Department of the Navy.

are steeped in materialism. The science of war has been subordinated to the science of material. The processes of manufacture are more interesting to the majority of them than is the use of the instruments in war. We go to great pains to design ships, and experiment with all manner of war material, but when it comes to the supreme test of all these inventions, as to how they will be employed, how they will be grouped, how they will be supplied, and how they will be fought. these questions we leave unanswered.

The placing of our navy on a war footing is a political act of the most vital importance. In war as in business, successful combination, or, better, concentration, by which is meant the massing of forces for a concerted effort, depends upon the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the organization through all activities down to the lowest group. It depends upon the intelligent action of subordinates in grasping and applying the plan of the leader of the organization. It depends upon the discipline which insures intelligent obedience to the directing will of the organization as well as on the mobility and flexibility in the organization which gives rapid effect to a decision by the leader and permits the taking advantage of fleeting opportunities.

In the Navy Department, for seventy years results have been accomplished only through

voluminous correspondence, regulations, and instructions which have sapped the enthusiasm and initiative of every subordinate of the navy. The intelligent, loyal exercise of initiative is the true secret of success in war as in business. Initiative is the word which expresses the mental qualities of the subordinate who, knowing the general policy of the organization in which his activity is a unit, strives to attain the result desired by going beyond the letter of his instructions while obeying them in the spirit. If, therefore, subordinate officers are to exercise initiative, they must know the general policy of the military leader of the organization and the result to be attained. Then, with his knowledge of his specialty, he can achieve results by devising methods to accomplish the aim desired. The principles of the art of war for the navy must be passed through a critical and constructive mind and become a general body of instructions before they can be of practical use. Whether in war or in the preparation for war, that critical and constructive mind will be the group mind of a reflective and inquiring general staff adequately provided with an instrument of research in the form of a cultured and well-endowed historical section. Before there can be good practice there must be a true theory, and true theory can be acquired only from historical study pursued according to recognized methods.

Theory cannot have an independent existence. It must always derive its sustenance from fresh contact with the historical reality of which it is the abstract. On the other hand, historical study which does not yield a theory is barren and useless. Such a group mind has its being in our existing general board, but what authority has such a body when it is shorn of the responsibility of carrying out its recommendations? Until this grave defect in our organization of the navy is changed, inefficiency will increase year by year, as its material and the number of its personnel grow larger.¹

¹ Since this chapter was written Congress passed the naval appropriation bill which included a provision for the creation of a legalized chief of naval operations. This is most important legislation in the right direction. But it took almost thirty years to obtain this concession from our legislators.

CHAPTER X

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET

THE correct employment of the fleet is to be found in the consideration that the fleet is an instrument of national policy. Its efficiency is, therefore, to increase the prestige of the government's diplomacy. It is a weapon which diplomacy holds ready for use when the occasion demands, in order to preserve the life and happiness of the nation against outside foes. Its duties in time of peace are, on the other hand, twofold: (1) to thoroughly prepare itself so as to be ready, immediately upon the outbreak of war, to take the initiative against the enemy's fleet; (2) to protect our national and commercial interests in every foreign land.

It will be seen that, in their accomplishment, these two services are conflicting. This knowledge has, therefore, caused the evolution of a type of vessel to be used for the second duty only. These ships need be only small in tonnage, for they are merely the symbol of force in the diplomacy of the nation. Their guns are their badge of duty, not for use in war with a great power,

but against unorganized mobs in countries where the full benefits of civilization have not penetrated. The number of these peace ships, or vessels of diplomacy, will depend upon the extent of the nation's responsibilities abroad. This duty might also be performed by vessels in reserve, or by the small cruisers of a fleet, when not actively engaged in manœuvres with the fleet.

The first step required in the preparing of a fleet for war is the making of a plan for the employment of the entire available fleet of the nation at least once a year in manœuvres, to continue until the commander-in-chief is satisfied that the weapons intrusted to his care are sufficient for the nation's purpose. The plan-making body, the general staff, or, in the absence of one, the general board, should complete the plan for the mobilization exactly in the manner that they would prepare the navy for war, except that the auxiliary vessels necessary to supply the fleet in a distant area of operations need not always be fitted out. But how could such a mobilization be held when we have neither officers nor men for our ships in ordinary, nor the reserves to call upon in case of emergency? With what Congress has given it, the navy annually accomplishes more in war games and tactical work than any other navy in the world. Ours is a real sea-going navy—a "fleet in being." But its organization

is not such that it could expand in times of mobilization or of war. Its organization is, on the contrary, fictitious and planned solely to give a constant uniform amount of work at the navy-yards. It is a fleet organization that, if mobilized for *actual* exercise, would reveal weaknesses apparent even to the most casual observer.

Upon the completion of a mobilization, the fleet should be divided for manœuvres and a problem devised in order that the commanders of each division or squadron will be given an opportunity to handle their ships against an opponent, in the manner that would be done in war. It is unnecessary to go further in the description of such a mobilization and manœuvres. All nations that have navies worthy of the name carry on manœuvres each year. Their records can be found in all the current foreign journals and in naval annuals. The United States alone refuses to expend the necessary money to train its fleet systematically in this most improved and scientific manner.

If, by chance, the navy of the United States were mobilized in the manner described above, we should find that the personnel of the navy was totally inadequate to put in effective commission all our fighting units. There would be lacking 18,556 trained men and 933 line officers to fully man the vessels now on our navy list. The war material available would not fill half our needs.

We should find that our destroyers had only one torpedo per tube. Having expended over \$1,000,000 for a destroyer, the nation refuses to spend more than \$50,000 for the weapons which alone make it useful. This same defect we should find in our submarines, while for the ships that we have armed with guns we may discover a deficiency in powder and shell. Such a mobilization and, afterward, free criticism of the existing conditions by the naval officers themselves, will be the only effective method of bringing to the notice of the country the unpreparedness of our fleet. Then a remedy will be applied. Unfortunately, the navy has been so long the football of politicians that each party in power fears the exposures which will result from such a proceeding, and, having the power to stop it, exercises that power and leaves the nation in ignorance of the true condition of its defenses.

In a small way actual manoeuvres have been attempted by our fleet, but they have been held only in miniature, and were quite disappointing to the officers who participated in them. Naval officers who are asked the question will deplore the lack of real war manoeuvres in the war training of the fleet. They appreciate the necessity for them, yet an obstacle insurmountable stands in the way. For such manoeuvres money is required; but the legislators will not appropriate

the funds to cover their expense. If the navy were a baseball team, Congress would understand that it was necessary for it to play rival teams to perfect its team-work in order to fit it to play ball. It would know that simply practising pitching, batting, and throwing the ball around does not develop the team-work necessary to beat a rival team. The navy is permitted to hold target practice, which is analogous to the "battery" practice and throwing the ball. It is permitted to take cruises, which may be likened to running the bases. It is permitted to hold tactical drills, which correspond to batting practice and catching flies. But at no time during the year is it permitted, as a team, to *play ball*, to engage in war manœuvres on an extensive scale, with all the units necessary in war—battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries, tenders, fuel ships, and hospital ships—yet until these manœuvres *are* held successfully every year the fleet cannot be considered as prepared.

Why the battleship fleet should remain on the Atlantic coast is a subject that has often been discussed. The reason is evident. The Atlantic coast of the United States is the centre of wealth and the centre of all the mechanical and industrial activities of the nation. There the great fleet can be kept prepared and maintained in repair in time

of peace. The facilities on the Pacific coast, on the other hand, are inadequate. The Pacific coast is far removed from the sources of metal and fuel, the vital necessities required in the fleet's upkeep. The opening of the Panama Canal has made our coast continuous, and the fleet is now able to move as a unit from one end of the coast-line to the other to wherever danger may threaten. All that is needed for the protection of the coast is a delaying force, consisting of shore batteries, soldiers, submarines, and torpedo craft. With such delaying forces based at important strategic points an enemy can be prevented from raiding the coast in the absence of the battle fleet or can be held in check until the fleet can reach the point attacked.

From the strategic point of view the United States would be in a stronger military situation if the Philippine Islands were not a part of its outlying possessions. For they lie within the strategical control of Japan. Even Guam, in its present state of defenselessness, is a source of weakness. In case of a war in the Pacific, Hawaii will therefore, if sufficiently garrisoned, form our most western position of safety. From this point, securely held, some claim that the United States might be able to fight to gain the domination of the western Pacific. On the other hand, if Guam could be securely held, which is now

unlikely, then that island would form our most western salient. All these strategical considerations are of interest to the nation, but it is this very "military road" and the consequent necessity of bases to protect the communications that most of our people do not appreciate. Alaska is not meteorologically possible on account of the prevailing fogs and strong currents. Yet Alaska is rich in mineral wealth and in fuel, and some day these dangers will be braved by a victorious fleet, in order to gain for its country the great resources of that territory which, even at this date, lie undeveloped. All these considerations show us how vital is the need for naval preparedness. Naval preparedness alone will keep united the colonial possessions which we are now so fortunate as to own.

Do not let us be led into the vain belief that disarmament and the establishment of an international court of arbitral justice will arise after the great war in Europe is over. For the enforcement of the decrees of such a tribunal an international police would have to be created.¹ This is an Utopian dream, long hoped for by mankind, but certainly not yet to be realized. Our peace advocates are "appalled by the great economic

¹ It would be well for us to recall here how, from 1820 to 1862, such a police was proposed by Great Britain for the suppression of the slave-trade on the west coast of Africa, and opposed by the United States.

waste of the war, the depletion of the treasuries of the warring nations, the loss of useful manhood, the destruction of vast industries, and the desecration of those monuments of piety and learning for which the whole civilized world had reverence," but, unfortunately, such consequences are a part of man's evolution, and the human race must continue to suffer and to die for the benefit of future generations. We of this generation must suffer for the sake of those to follow, and each generation must accept its share of the world's sorrow and pain, giving its life-blood to cleanse the world's morality.

Fleets and armies must be maintained, and maintained in efficiency, for they reflect the state of the nation that they represent. Otherwise we must acknowledge our moral inferiority and accept pusillanimously our moral defeat as a nation.

CHAPTER XI

THE PERSONNEL

MOST people believe that a navy consists solely of ships. In alarm the press cries for ships and more ships; but little or no attention is devoted to the provision of men.

There is a wide-spread misconception throughout the country, and even in the councils of our service, that an effective navy depends only upon the building of an adequate number of ships, whereas the real secret of naval power lies in the steady, uniform training for war and in the provision of men and ships in proper proportion to suit the ultimate plan of campaign. Public opinion clamors for results; yet that same public opinion refuses the funds necessary to bring about those results. Through our military strength only can we further the cause of peace. A strong nation prepared for war but willing to arbitrate would be a spectacle of which our peace advocates could well be proud, but a weak nation, as we are forced to consider ourselves, raising its puny voice for arbitration with a strong military power desiring a share of our holdings would be a spectacle

too despicable to be heeded. Yet the character of our race is such that, unless danger stares us in the face, we are indisposed to lay out money as insurance of our own defense.

When we consider the inadequacy of our present naval personnel to man properly the ships that we have, is it not time that we took an inventory and found out the true value of our naval establishment? Three years are required to build a battleship, and somewhat less time for the smaller units, but after the vessel is completed nearly six months are necessary, after her crew has been received, before the creation can be considered available for action against a fully trained enemy.

The recruit himself requires individual training. He must be taught self-reliance, yet be impressed with the spirit of subordination and discipline. He must learn to respect authority and accept responsibility. He must be educated in his own particular technical specialty. After this he must take his place in a great organization wherein there are thousands of other units. These units are formed into groups, and the groups again assembled into larger groups. Over each group is a subleader. The intricate organization of a battleship has been evolved through a process of selection that has required hundreds of years for its development. Its roots stretch back into the sailing days of Nelson, of Paul Jones, of Van

Tromp, and even to the row-galleys of Marc Antony. Once the crew has been received on board a battleship, the slow process of evolution must begin. At first all is chaos. Then slowly order arises. The process is slow, necessitating much training and a vast amount of instruction. The ship's complex machinery must be studied. The officers and men must get to know each other, and respect and appreciate each other's responsibilities. Unless mutual trust is engendered throughout the entire ship, co-ordination cannot be achieved. The ship must be trained to shoot, to manœuvre in company with other ships, to develop the full power of her machinery, to coal and take on stores with efficiency and despatch, to signal quickly and accurately. Until all these details have been developed to a high state of efficiency, the ship is not a full military unit.

With the navy's personnel short of officers and men, how can we expect, in the event of sudden war, to place our idle ships, now in ordinary or in reserve, in full commission and send them immediately to engage an enemy's fleet? Is it not murder to send out vessels as woefully unprepared as they will be? The casualties on the sea in the present war give us an idea of what may happen to such ships if they encounter an efficient enemy. In the fight off Chile, two modern British armored cruisers were sunk by the German squadron. Not a single member of their crews

was saved. In the fight off the Falkland Islands, where the same German squadron was defeated by a stronger British squadron, from the crews of three ships carrying nearly 2,000 men only 90 were saved. Does the nation desire to place its citizens in such jeopardy? On land the casualties of battle are not so appalling, considering them on a percentage basis, for the defeated troops can either run away or surrender. An army, after defeat, is disorganized; each individual looks out for himself. But a sinking ship remains an organization; every man follows the lead of the commander. And if the captain wills to go down with his ship his decision spells the doom of his entire crew.

To demonstrate how inadequate our present personnel is to man the ships already built or building for the navy, the following table has been prepared:

	England	Germany	United States	France	Japan
<i>Line and Engineer Officers....</i>	4,781	3,441	1,898	2,406	3,230
<i>Staff Officers—</i>					
Medical.....	593	340	336	390	364
Pay.....	750	276	231	211	388
Naval Constructors.....	122	162	75	187	135
Chaplains.....	147	30	24	0	0
	1,612	808	866	788	887
<i>Warrant Officers.....</i>	2,740	3,183	867	147	1,569
<i>Enlisted men.....</i>	119,597	65,797	52,566	60,505	50,050
<i>Marines—</i>					
Officers.....	465	177	341	0	0
Enlisted.....	21,414	5,791	9,915	0	0

This table is illuminating. It reveals an alarming shortage in the personnel of our navy. It shows that the vital need of the navy to-day is men, more men, and still more men. In his hearings before the committee on naval affairs of the House of Representatives, last December, the assistant secretary of the navy testified that an immediate increase of 18,000 enlisted men, as a minimum, was necessary to man properly the vessels already on the navy register. And the data above tabulated show us that we are not only short of enlisted men but also in need of officers to lead them.

The number of petty officers and enlisted men allowed by Congress by the Act of June 30, 1914, (for the number is fixed by law, since our legislators are the final arbiters of all that the navy *may* have) is 51,500. Not one additional man may the navy enlist in excess of that number. Consequently, although there were, in the fiscal year 1913-14, over 88,900 applicants for enlistment in the service, but 18,948 could be accepted because only that number of men in that same period left the service at the expiration of their terms of enlistment, or for other reasons. So that, while the navy is to-day recruited up to the full strength allowed by law, it lacks, nevertheless, over 18,000 men of the full number (70,000) required to properly man our ships.

In officers, whose total number and number in each grade are also determined by Congress, we find a similar serious shortage.¹ Thus, for the present, Congress has determined that there shall be 18 rear-admirals, 70 captains, 112 commanders, 200 lieutenant-commanders, 350 lieutenants, and over 350 lieutenants junior-grade and ensigns. Since Congress limits the number of officers in each grade, promotions from the lower grades can proceed only as fast as vacancies occur from retirements on account of age (sixty-two years), or from deaths, disablements, resignations, dismissals, or from other causes. Hence, there exists a situation in which officers enter the service in the lower ranks from the Naval Academy at the rate of from 150 to 200 a year, while in the higher ranks only about 40 leave in each year from the causes above enumerated. The result is that there is an ever-increasing congestion in the lower grades. An officer remains an ensign or a lieutenant junior-grade so long that by the time he is promoted to command rank he is long past his prime and, therefore, not able to do justice to himself or to the service under the more exacting duties and graver responsibilities of the higher grades.

¹ Whereas in 1884 there were allowed the navy 1,114 officers (line and engineer) and 8,250 enlisted men, to-day there are authorized 51,500 enlisted men, but only 1,898 officers. In other words, while the enlisted personnel in thirty years was increased 43,250, the number of officers to-day is only 784 greater than in 1884.

The personnel question is, then, most vital at the present moment. Until it has been attended to we shall not be able to say that we have a navy ready for war. The training of the enlisted men cannot be accomplished in a few months; it takes years to educate our officers in the professional subjects, and afterward several years more to give them the practical experience essential to supplement their technical knowledge; while in the highly trained warrant officers, those men who have won promotion from the ranks by ability and merit, the navy has a strength so great that they should be encouraged in every way possible.

The duty of correcting this evil devolves upon our legislators. Such a remedy has been proposed by the personnel board, appointed by the secretary of the navy last July. Will Congress heed the warning cry?¹

In addition to the regular enlisted personnel, there should exist also a trained naval reserve such as the great naval powers of Europe have had at their disposal to call upon in time of emergency. But *we* have *no* reserves. In time of war we would not even know beforehand the name, ability, or previous training of a single man who might volunteer. For the past six years the Navy Department has asked for legislation authorizing the establishment of a naval reserve of

¹ See the report of the personnel board, Appendix II.

officers and men, but Congress, until recently, turned a deaf ear. Our naval militia is too small in numbers and too limited in its training to provide that numerous and trained body of men which will be needed at the outbreak of hostilities. In such a crisis the navy will need the services of the ex-enlisted men of the service, who, after four years on shipboard, have passed back into civil life. Undoubtedly many of these men would return to the navy in time of war, but Congress should anticipate the emergency and provide forthwith for their legal enrollment.

In the administration of its personnel, then, as well as in the administration of its material, the navy needs a continuity of policy. This involves the training of both officers and men. And this means even more. For it concerns not only their education and their efficiency, but also their contentment, and their pride in a service that glories in the traditions of such men as John Paul Jones, John Barry, Edward Preble, Stephen Decatur, Oliver Hazard Perry, William Barker Cushing, and David Glasgow Farragut.

CHAPTER XII

EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

MAN, in the development of his mechanical achievements, unconsciously follows the law of evolution. He prefers to go step by step, feeling the way, instead of advancing by leaps and bounds into lands unexplored. The speed of evolution depends, therefore, upon the activity of the times or, in other words, upon the pressure of outside influences.

In times of peace the evolution of war-ships has been slow. After each war their progress has accelerated. Each type reaches its fullest development before a revolution in type occurs. But such revolution in type is made necessary only by the discovery of new or improved methods of offense, or on account of a change of material of which the existing types are built. In the last half-dozen years the evolution of the battleship has been extremely rapid, but it has not, as yet, reached its height. At the present moment, the indications are that the future development will be rather toward a combination of superior speed and gun power than toward armor protection.

The vessels with the torpedo as the sole weapon of offense, however, have periodically shaken men's convictions in first-line ships. To-day the submarine again rivets the world's attention.

The theme of the small vessel, protected from gun-fire by the natural armor of the ocean, has been the central thought in many flights of the imagination. What may be termed the torpedo peril, is not, however, a new acquaintance. We have met it frequently before; first in the days of Fulton, then in our Civil War when the spar torpedo was designed, and still later when the automobile torpedo surprised the world and gave food to man's imagination. The advent of the automobile torpedo threatened the battleship's supremacy as the queen of the seas; yet the battleship did not disappear. It held its own, emerging greater and more powerful. It will be remembered that France, under the spell of this marvellous weapon, feverishly built torpedo craft for a number of years and neglected her battleship fleet. Like all such radical movements, conceived under the impulse of hysteria, the pendulum swung too far. France, believing that her logical enemy was England or Germany, thought that with countless torpedo craft she could sweep the seas. But it was soon shown by less impulsive thinkers that the mastery of the sea was impossible without those great vessels armed with large-caliber turret guns, and

France was obliged to again take up her interrupted battleship-construction programme.

This year the torpedo peril is again with us—this time cloaked in the submarine. These vessels are equipped with Diesel Heavy Oil engines for surface-cruising and electric motor for submerged work, and carry torpedoes with heavy explosive charges. These two advances in engineering progress have made the submarine more reliable than heretofore, and have demonstrated its usefulness as an arm of the fleet, but not as a substitute for the fleet itself.¹

With the offensive submarine now a certainty, should we continue to build battleships? The new cruising submarine, if a success, may become a serious menace to a battleship fleet, but it does not seem a sufficient menace to stop the construction of those ships which have so long, and in the face of all challengers, held command of the sea.

The ultimate aim of war is to command the sea. It is as certain now as always that this command will go to the nation with the most mobile and powerful fleets of all types, each to be used in its

¹ For in the torpedo-boat destroyer there has been developed a defense against the submarine whose value is more pronounced since it is equally effective against the enemy's destroyer and submarine. In this respect, the facility with which the British destroyers have been able to evade submarine attack, and in some cases sink the submarines themselves by ramming and gun-fire, has been one of the unexpected developments of the present war.

proper sphere of action. The submarine and the destroyer, armed with long-range torpedoes, are a natural menace to the advancing enemy. But they can be met by changes of construction in the battleship and by the provision of a sufficient number of similar types in our own fleet.

In these days of marvellous mechanical and electrical devices, men's imaginations are apt to soar to illimitable heights. But a vessel designed to dive below the surface of the sea is not one upon which to place too much reliance. As long as the nations of the earth are separated by great expanses of ocean there will be a vital necessity for a strong fleet of capital ships. The capital ship may change her shape and the material and methods of her construction. The grand old wooden *Victory*, Nelson's line-of-battle ship, and the present dreadnaught, *New York*, may bear little resemblance, yet each, as the distinctive type of her day, stood for the command of the sea. The future mistress of the ocean will, likewise, be a vessel in which there can be placed the most absolute confidence. She must, therefore, be a thoroughly trustworthy type, capable of keeping the sea in all weathers. She must be habitable for a large crew and be armed with the most powerful weapons. She must be able to take the offensive and defensive against any possible opponent. She must be swift, active, and

dependable, and must be able, with the aid of her auxiliaries, to control the entire area through which she will have to operate.

Nelson said that his ships of the line were the best diplomats in Europe, and the history of England proved the truth of that saying. With our own peace assured, we can labor successfully for the peace of the world. But with the will to do this, we should remember that we must have also the power to enforce it. Our proclamation of world policies has imposed upon us great obligations, national obligations, of making secure our influence near our own shores and in the eastern Pacific. For this purpose we have but one main defense—our navy, if it is adequate, efficient, and well administered.

APPENDIX I

THE REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

GENERAL BOARD,

WASHINGTON, *November 17, 1914.*

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Increase of the Navy; building program and personnel, 1916.

Reference: Department's indorsement 8557-146 : 11, September 22, 1914.

Article 167, paragraph 3, United States Navy Regulations, 1913, reads as follows:

“It (the General Board) shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and rating of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increase as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress.”

The General Board in compliance with duties thus imposed upon it by this and similar paragraphs in preceding regulations has from year to year recommended to the department a building program and personnel legislation that would, in its opinion, produce a fleet that would be adequate to the needs of the Nation.

2. In view of conditions now existing the General Board has given particularly careful thought to its recommendations for the coming fiscal year. To make its position clear and place before the department the full meaning of its recommendations, the General Board considers it necessary to review at length all that has preceded these recommendations and led up to them.

CONSISTENT POLICY OF GENERAL BOARD SINCE 1903

3. In its letter No. 420-2, of October 17, 1903, the General Board, after mature consideration of our national policies and interests, and of those of the other leading naval nations of the world, expressed its opinion of what the ultimate strength of the United States Navy should be, and recommended a program for the completion of the Navy to the strength then believed adequate by 1919.

4. The basis of the fleet recommended was 48 battleships; and lesser units and auxiliaries were recommended in the proportions believed to be best to complete a fighting fleet, in the light of the best information obtainable at that time. The influence of the progress made by new inventions and the discovery of new ideas in the development of the lesser units have changed the proportions and character of some of these lesser units; and have, to that extent, modified the original recommendations of the General Board. But the fundamental fact that the power of a fleet is to be measured by the number and efficiency of its heavy fighting units, or battleships, has remained unchanged. The recommendations of the General Board heretofore submitted have consistently followed a policy looking to the creation of a fleet founded on a battleship strength of 48, in accordance with its recommendation

made in 1903, of what it considered an adequate fleet to meet the naval needs of the Nation and be an adequate insurance against aggression.

5. The General Board believes that these recommendations made from year to year have been both misunderstood and misconstrued in some quarters. An impression prevails that the General Board has always recommended an annual continuing building program of four battleships, with accompanying lesser units and auxiliaries. A brief analysis of the recommendations made by the General Board, beginning with the original formulation of its policy in 1903, to the present time, will demonstrate the error of this impression, and show that the recommendations made were consistent and contemplated the creation of a battleship fleet of 48 vessels by 1919, *but did not involve a constant and fixed program of building four battleships a year.*

BATTLESHIPS

6. In October, 1903, the Navy had 10 battleships completed and 14 more either under construction or authorized. The last of these 14 was to be completed by 1907. In view of this condition, and to complete a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919, the General Board in paragraph 8 of its letter of October 17, 1903, recommended:

"8. To sum up, the General Board recommends that Congress be requested to authorize for the present a yearly building program, not limited by the amount appropriated last year, composed of the following ships: Two battleships, etc."

To this letter was appended a table, quoted below, showing what the condition of the Navy would be in battleships, year by year, to 1919, starting with the 10 com-

pleted and 14 already building or authorized, if the recommendation of the General Board for a two-battleship per year program from 1904 were followed.

YEAR	BATTLESHIPS		YEAR	BATTLESHIPS	
	Com- pleted	Author- ized		Com- pleted	Author- ized
1903.....	10	14	1912.....	34	2
1904.....	12	2	1913.....	36	2
1905.....	17	2	1914.....	38	2
1906.....	19	2	1915.....	40	2
1907.....	24	2	1916.....	42	..
1908.....	26	2	1917.....	44	..
1909.....	28	2	1918.....	46	..
1910.....	30	2	1919.....	48	..
1911.....	32	2			

7. It will be seen from the foregoing table that the General Board's recommendation provided for a *two-battleship program* consistently pursued from 1904 to 1915 to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. In these recommendations replacements were not considered, nor had limits of age been placed on battleships. The fundamental idea, however, was a two-battleship program to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. A larger program to hasten the completion of the fleet had been considered, but had been rejected because it was believed a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919 would answer all needs, in view of the known building programs of other countries.

8. In pursuance of this policy the General Board, as stated above, began its yearly recommendations by asking that two battleships be authorized in 1904. The following table shows the yearly programs recommended. The reasons for an increase over two battleships annually are given in succeeding paragraphs.

YEAR	BATTLESHIPS		YEAR	BATTLESHIPS	
	Recom- mended by General Board	Author- ized by Congress		Recom- mended by General Board	Author- ized by Congress
1904.....	2	1	1909.....	4	2
1905.....	3	2	1910.....	4	2
1906.....	3	1	1911.....	4	2
1907.....	2	1	1912.....	4	1
1908.....	4	2	1913.....	4	1

9. The recommendation for the laying down of two ships in 1904 failed of enactment, and only one was provided for, leaving the program for the creation of a 48-battleship fleet by 1919 one ship in arrears. To make this deficiency good, and maintain the general program, one additional ship, or three in all, were recommended for the 1905 program. Two were authorized, still leaving a deficiency of one for the two years, 1904 and 1905. To provide for this three were again recommended for the 1906 program. In 1906 and again in 1907 one ship only was authorized, leaving by 1908 the general program three ships in arrears. To begin making this deficiency good the General Board for the 1908 program recommended the authorization of four ships. From 1908 to 1911, inclusive, Congress followed the original program and provided for two battleships yearly. The accumulated shortage of three ships still remained, however, during these four years, and the General Board recommended year by year the laying down of four ships to begin making this good, since each succeeding year found the shortage still there.

10. In 1910 a new element entered, not considered in the original program. The fleet of 48 battleships contemplated in the program put forward in 1903, on a two-

battleship per year building program, to be ready by 1919, contained all battleships then borne on the list, beginning with the *Indiana*. Experience had not yet in 1903 demonstrated the effective life of battleships, nor had any exhaustive study been made of it. Beginning with the program recommended for 1911 in General Board's letter No. 420-2 of May 24, 1910, this matter was seriously taken into consideration, since experience had shown that the three older battleships, the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts* and *Oregon*, then 20 years old from date of authorization, were approaching the limit of their effective life. Further studies from our own experience and from that of other navies, and from practice abroad convinced the General Board that the effective life of battleships is about 20 years from time of completion; and that hence, to maintain a fleet at a given strength, it is necessary to lay down a replacement ship 20 years from the time of the laying down of the original ship. Hence, replacement ships for the *Indiana*, *Oregon* and *Massachusetts* should have been laid down in 1910, for the *Iowa* in 1912, and new replacement ships should be begun for the *Kentucky* and *Kearsarge* in 1915. These matters, together with the shortage of three battleships already existing in 1911, were taken into consideration by the General Board in making its recommendations for a four-battleship program in both 1912 and 1913. One battleship only was authorized in each of these two years, increasing the shortage in the original program to five, without considering replacement ships for the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Massachusetts* and *Iowa*, already overdue for authorization.

11. The preceding analysis shows clearly the error in the prevailing impression that the General Board has heretofore advocated a navy based on a continuous build-

ing program of four battleships a year, and proves that up to the present it has advocated continuously and consistently a program to produce a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. This would have called for, considering replacements, a general two-battleship program with a third added every three years. The number of battleships called for by this policy, 48, and the date set for their completion, by 1919, were fixed by a calm and logical review of the policies and aims of the Nation and the known laws and prospective developments and aims of other countries; and the policy was to provide and maintain at all times *a fleet equal to or superior to that of any nation likely to challenge our policies.*

12. The 1903 program given in paragraph 6 of this letter, as modified by the replacement policy in 1910, called for at this date, November, 1914:

(a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service, less than 20 years old from completion.....	38
(b) Battleships under construction.....	7
(c) Battleships authorized in 1914.....	2
Total.....	47

13. The actual situation of the fleet as relates to battleships at this date, November, 1914, is as follows:

(a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service, less than 20 years old from completion (since the sale of the <i>Mississippi</i> and <i>Idaho</i>).....	30
(b) Battleships under construction.....	4
(c) Battleships authorized in 1914.....	2
(d) To replace <i>Mississippi</i> and <i>Idaho</i>	1
Total.....	37

14. This shows that we are now deficient 10 battleships, built, building, and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program.

15. The General Board has made the foregoing brief analysis to set forth clearly the reasons for and meaning of all the recommendations it has made for battleship construction up to this time; and to show the conception under which the General Board has acted in the performance of its duty, under the Regulations, as the responsible advisers of the Secretary in all matters relating to the strength of the fleet, and the number and character of the units composing it. In the matter of battleships, the final result of all recommendations, and of all action taken thereon up to this date, has been to produce a completed battle line of 8 units less than the General Board believed to be safe, and with 2 units less under construction and authorized than was needed to continue the expansion of the fleet to the strength laid down in the policy.

16. The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the Nation without being a protection. It cannot, therefore, too strongly urge the adoption by the Government of a policy looking to the making good of the deficiencies of the past, and the building up of this arm of the national defense until it becomes equal to the task that war will put upon it. That point will not be reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest probable adversary.

17. The wisdom of such a policy is well illustrated by recent events, and is reinforced by the teachings of all history. For a review of the history of all ages will show that no nation has ever created and maintained a great over-sea commerce without the support of sea power. It will further show that trade rivalry, which is the active expression of the most universal of all human traits—

desire for gain—has been a most fruitful cause of war; and, when the clash has come, the commerce of the weaker sea power has been broken up and driven from the seas. That has been true for all time, and is true to-day; and has a particular bearing on the United States at the present time, when such strenuous efforts are being made to build up a national merchant marine and extend our foreign commerce.

18. In the matter of national defense, history teaches still another great lesson particularly applicable to ourselves. That is, that a nation, insular in character or separated by bodies of water from other nations can and must rely on its Navy—when that Navy is adequate—for protection and freedom from invasion and may keep its own soil free from all wars other than civil. The United States is one among the few nations of the world that occupy this happy position, being insular in so far as any nation, capable of making serious war upon us is concerned, since any opponent that need be considered must come to us from across the seas. Our main defense and protection from invasion must, therefore, always rest with the Navy, which must ever remain our first and best line of defense. This defense, unless adequate, is impotent; and, as before stated, adequacy is not reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the Navy of the strongest probable adversary.

19. In the matter of battleships the General Board remains of the opinion that it has always held, that command of the sea can only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all weathers and overcome the strongest enemy vessels that may be brought against them. Other types are valuable and have their particular uses, all of which are indispensable, but limited in character. But, what has been true

throughout all naval wars of the past, and what is equally true to-day, is that the backbone of any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest sea-going, sea-keeping ships of its day, or, of its battleships. The General Board recommends, therefore, in the light of all the information it has up to this present date that the development of the battleship fleet be continued as the primary aim in naval development, and that four (4) of them be authorized in the 1916 program.

DESTROYERS

20. For the general purposes of war on the sea the General Board has placed the destroyer as the type of warship next in importance to the battleship, and has based the programs it has recommended on that idea. After very mature consideration of all the elements involved, and a study of the results obtained from fleet maneuvers, the General Board came to the conclusion that a well-balanced fighting fleet, for all the purposes of offense and defense, called for a relative proportion of four destroyers to one battleship. Hence, for every battleship built four destroyers should be provided. The General Board still holds this opinion and, therefore, recommends that sixteen (16) destroyers be provided in the 1916 program.

FLEET SUBMARINES

21. For several years past all leading navies have been striving to perfect a submarine of an enlarged type with habitability, radius and speed sufficient to enable it to accompany the fleet and act with it tactically, both in offense and defense. Our designers and builders have been devoting their efforts to the same end and are now ready to guarantee such a type and one such vessel was

provided for in the appropriation act of 1914. The great difficulty in the past in the production of this type has been the lack of a reliable internal combustion engine of the requisite power to give the necessary speed. This difficulty has been overcome, and the General Board is assured that engines have been designed and fully tested that will meet the requirements; and the builders stand ready to guarantee the results. The value of such a type in war for distant work with the fleet can hardly be overestimated, and the General Board recommends that three (3) be provided in the 1916 program. These with the one already authorized, will form a fleet submarine division of four for work with the fleet and be the beginning of a powerful arm of the fleet.

COAST SUBMARINES

22. For the submarine for coast defense and for occasional acting with the fleet in home waters, the General Board sees no necessity for boats of as great speed and size as the later designs, made before the sea-going submarine was believed to be in sight. In fact, any increase of size is detrimental, in that it increases draft and debars them from shallow waters; and any increase of speed in this class of submarines is not needed, and is gained at the expense of other desirable qualities. Between the coast-defense submarine and the submarine of sufficient size, radius, habitability and surface speed to accompany and act with the fleet tactically, the General Board sees no necessity in naval warfare for an intermediate type. It is therefore recommended that the submarines for the coast work be of the general characteristics already prescribed in General Board letter No. 420-15, of June 10, 1914, and that sixteen (16) of these be provided for in the 1916 program.

SCOUT CRUISERS

23. In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy—battleships, destroyers and submarines—the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no cruisers or scouts have been provided for since 1904, when the *Montana*, *North Carolina*, *Birmingham*, *Chester* and *Salem* were authorized. This leaves the fleet peculiarly lacking in this element so necessary for information in a naval campaign, and of such great value in clearing the sea of torpedo and mining craft, in opening and protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, and in closing and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the enemy. The General Board believes that this branch of the fleet has been too long neglected and recommends that the construction of this important and necessary type be resumed. For the 1916 program it is recommended that four (4) scout cruisers be provided.

AIR CRAFT

24. The General Board in its endorsement No. 449 of August 30, 1913, and accompanying memorandum brought to the attention of the department the dangerous situation of the country in the lack of air craft and air men in both the naval and military services. A résumé was given in that endorsement with the accompanying memorandum of conditions in the leading countries abroad at that date, showing the preparations being made for air warfare and the use of air craft by both armies and navies, and contrasting their activity with our own inactivity. Certain recommendations were made in the same endorsement looking to the beginning of the establishment of a proper air service for the Navy.

25 The total result of that effort was the appointment of a board on aeronautics October 9, 1913. That board made further recommendations, among them the establishment of an aeronautic school and station at Pensacola and the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, 1 fleet dirigible and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of air craft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work.

26. In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the past year, and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper air service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now developed air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities.

27. In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. We would be without the means of detecting the presence of submarines or mine fields or of attempting direct attack on the enemy from the air, while our own movements would be an open book to him. The General Board can not too strongly urge that the department's most serious thought be given to this matter, and that immediate steps be taken to remedy it, and recommends that Congress be asked for an appropriation of at least \$5,000,000, to be made available immediately, for the purpose of establishing an efficient air service.

GUNBOATS

28. The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under "gunboats," only a

very limited number of these 30 are in a condition to be available for general service. Some, like the *Villalobos*, *Callao*, *Samar*, *Sandoval*, etc., are old boats of little value taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons and less. Of the others, with the exception of the light-draft river gunboats *Monocacy* and *Palos*, and the *Sacramento*, no gunboats have been authorized since 1902. Seven are at present assigned to Naval Militia duty, and three others have been recently withdrawn from that service because of the crying need for more gunboats for general duty. Those remaining on the list serviceable and fit for general duty are so limited in number that it has been necessary in recent years to detail battleships, large cruisers and destroyers to do gunboat duty. This has been markedly demonstrated during the past year on the Mexican coast. It would seem superfluous to point out the harmful influence this has on the efficiency and training of the fleet for war and the General Board advises strongly against such practice whenever it can be possibly avoided. It is therefore recommended that a beginning be made to replace the old and worn-out gunboats, that there may be sufficient of them to do the police and general diplomatic duties required of such vessels in time of peace without disrupting the battle fleet. To this end it is recommended that four (4) be authorized in the 1916 program. With the exception of the *Sacramento*, authorized in 1911, no seagoing gunboat has been authorized since 1902.

AUXILIARIES

FUEL SHIPS

29. In the matter of auxiliaries needed for the fleet the General Board is of the opinion that the most serious situation exists in the matter of fuel-oil supply, and that

provision for oil-fuel ships should be given first consideration. This is serious from the point of view of economy in time of peace, and would be disastrous in the event of hostilities arising. We have 41 oil-burning destroyers built or building, to be followed by others, 8 ships of the dreadnaught type using oil as an auxiliary fuel, and in 1915 the two first all-oil-fuel battleships will be added to the fleet, to be followed by others. To supply this oil-burning fleet with fuel the Navy possesses the *Arethusa*, an old tank ship of 3,629 tons capacity and not more than 10 knots speed, and seven fleet colliers fitted to carry some fuel oil in addition. The total oil capacity is 23,728 tons, 3,629 tons of which—that in the *Arethusa*—could not accompany the fleet; so that the present available oil supply that could accompany the fleet is 20,109 tons. Logistic studies show that to maintain our present oil-burning fleet in active service across the ocean requires the delivery of about 23,000 tons of fuel oil per month. To maintain this supply we have the seven colliers mentioned above capable of delivering an average of about 10,000 tons per month. This situation will be very much aggravated on the addition to the fleet of the two all-oil-burning battleships, *Oklahoma* and *Nevada*, and the other destroyers now under construction. Nor can commercial oil carriers be relied upon to remedy this deficiency, since ocean tankage both at home and abroad is not yet adequate to meet the demands of commerce and industry.

30. To partially meet this situation two oil-fuel ships of a combined cargo capacity of 15,108 tons were authorized in August, 1912. On November 1, 1914, one of these ships was only 82.4 per cent completed and the other only 57.2 per cent completed.

31. To remedy this serious defect in our preparedness for war the General Board recommended the construction

of two (2) oil-fuel ships in the 1915 program. These were not authorized and the General Board therefore emphatically repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program, and further recommends that the construction of the two ships authorized in August, 1912, more than two years ago, be hastened with all possible speed.

DESTROYER TENDERS AND SUBMARINE TENDERS

32. The auxiliaries of next importance to the fleet at the present time, after the oil-fuel ships, are destroyer tenders and submarine tenders. Of the three improvised vessels used as destroyer tenders the *Iris*, built in 1885, is past her period of usefulness and should be replaced. The General Board recommended one (1) destroyer tender in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program.

33. Of the six vessels used as submarine tenders, all are of the improvised variety, and none is well fitted for the service. Three of them are old monitors, two of them old gunboats, and one the old sailing ship *Severn*. To begin replacing these, one submarine tender was authorized in 1911, another in 1912, and one (1) was recommended in 1913 for the 1915 program. This last was not authorized, and this recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program.

TRANSPORTS

34. The General Board has from time to time, in numerous letters extending over a series of years, called the attention of the department to the inadequacy of preparation in the Navy for advanced base work and to the vital importance of this work to success in war. The prerequisite for any advanced base work is the necessary

means for transportation of the personnel and material of the advanced base outfit; and for this reason the General Board has recommended the construction of the two transports needed for the purpose—ships of the size and speed necessary and especially designed for what they were intended to accomplish. Their primary use was to be for war, but secondarily they could be used in general transportation service at all times. Not one of the four improvised transports now in service in the Navy—the *Hancock*, *Rainbow*, *Prairie* and *Buffalo*—is of the size, or is fitted, for the work required, nor of the character of construction needed for safety in ships carrying large bodies of men. All are old single-skin ships without proper water-tight subdivision. Of the two transports needed, one was authorized in 1913, and the other recommended in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

HOSPITAL SHIP

35. The General Board in making the foregoing recommendations has given preference to what is needed for the fighting efficiency of the fleet over all other matters. Two other types of auxiliaries, however, are required for the successful administration of the fleet—hospital and supply ships.

36. The two hospital ships now borne on the Navy list—the *Solace* and the *Relief*—are both improvised and small, and neither adapted to the service. They have done good service in time of peace in connection with subdivisions of the fleet, but the *Relief* is now unseaworthy and the *Solace* would be of limited value in time of war. To remedy this defect, the General Board recommended the construction of one (1) hospital ship in the 1915 pro-

gram. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

SUPPLY SHIPS

37. Of the four ships borne on the Navy list as supply ships, all are improvised and were hurriedly bought and fitted in 1898 to meet the exigencies of the Spanish War. The *Supply* is already beyond her period of usefulness, and has been discarded as a supply ship. The *Culgoa* is approaching her limit of usefulness. The *Celtic* and *Glacier*, while old and inadequately fitted, are still good for some years service. One new ship was authorized in 1913. Another is needed, and to meet this situation the General Board recommended the construction of one (1) supply ship in the 1915 program. This was not authorized and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

SUMMARY

38. To summarize, the General Board recommends for the 1916 program—

- 4 battleships.
- 16 destroyers.
- 3 fleet submarines.
- 16 coast submarines.
- 4 scouts.
- 4 gunboats.
- 2 oil-fuel ships.
- 1 destroyer tender.
- 1 submarine tender.
- 1 Navy transport.
- 1 hospital ship.
- 1 supply ship.
- Air service—\$5,000,000.

PERSONNEL

39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board, made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a *trained* personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

41. The strength of fleets is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel—with their skill and training—and its material; and of these two elements the more important—the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The General Board can not impress this point too strongly on the department or recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct it, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve, sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes.

42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its Navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; *and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men* sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus, every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with officers and men trained for the service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserves, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve.

43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

(a) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

(b) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (a).

(c) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the Naval Militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

(d) That the Naval Militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to re-inforce the regular service at need.

GEORGE DEWEY.

APPENDIX II

THE REPORT OF BOARD ON INCREASED EFFICIENCY OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1915.*

From: The Personnel Board.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Report of the board.

1. The Board on Increased Efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy submits herewith the draft of a bill to provide for proper distribution of officers of the Navy in the various grades in accordance with the needs of the service; to insure a uniform flow of promotion; and to give all officers equal opportunity for advancement.

2. The bill abolishes the so-called plucking board. In lieu thereof it establishes the principle of promotion by competitive methods and the selection of the most efficient, together with the creation of an active reserve list for those officers not chosen for promotion. Officers placed on this reserve list will continue to render active service but will not be promoted except for special meritorious services.

3. The competitive method of promotion recognizes three factors: First, professional knowledge; second, the official record of past performances; and, third, service

opinion obtained from the recommendations of officers senior in the service.

4. The paramount problem in all matters relating to personnel is that of fairly disposing of the unavoidable surplus of officers from the lower grades as they pass to and through the upper grades. As to the existence of this surplus, it is sufficient to refer to the fact that the complement of a battleship contains one captain and from 10 to 15 ensigns. The experience of our Navy has shown that out of 150 ensigns fresh from the Naval Academy there will be at the end of 34 years but 5 needed for the grade of rear admiral. The experience of other nations is in substantial agreement. Death and disability will not sufficiently reduce the original numbers; artificial means must therefore be resorted to.

5. Under the system we propose a midshipman on entering the Naval Academy becomes a member of a class varying in number from 250 to 300. After four years' work, with the consequent elimination of the least fit, about 150 should be taken into the service as ensigns at an average age of about 22. After three years' service as ensign a competitive examination will be held, establishing their order of merit. Of the original 150, then reduced by natural causes to about 135, 100 will be continued in the line of the Navy and approximately 25 others in the Pay, Construction, Civil Engineer, and Marine Corps. The remaining ensigns, approximately 10 yearly—those at the bottom—will be honorably discharged with one year's pay, as was the case for many years in the past with surplus midshipmen.

6. The 100 ensigns remaining in the line will be commissioned lieutenants (junior grade). At the end of six years those remaining will be promoted to the grade of lieutenant subject to the usual examinations. They will

remain in the grade of lieutenant for a similar period of six years, those remaining will become candidates for promotion. At this point will begin the process of promotion by selection and the transfer to the active reserve list of those not promoted. Normally two out of every three lieutenants will be promoted to the grade of lieutenant commander, and the length of service in this grade is also six years. At the end of that period those remaining will become candidates for promotion to the grade of commander. About one-half will be promoted and the other half transferred to the active reserve list. Those promoted will serve as commanders for six years. About one-half will then be promoted in the same manner to the grade of captain. Seven years is the period of service prescribed for captain, and the class originally composed of 150 ensigns will, on arriving at the top of the list of captains at the end of 34 years' service, be reduced to approximately 10 on the active list. Of this number 5 will go up to the grade of rear admiral and the remainder will be placed on the active reserve list.

7. The foregoing outline applies to the normal course after the proposed system is in full operation. Existing "humps" in the personnel of the service will take a number of years to smooth out, but it is believed that the process laid down will be carried on with the greatest possible fairness to the officers affected. For a number of years to come the transfers to the active reserve list will be less numerous than when the bill is in full operation, especially transfers from the lower grades.

8. The same general principles applied to the line of the Navy have been applied to the various staff corps.

9. In like manner provision is made for the advancement to the grade of master of the most efficient commissioned warrant officers. The board believes that the

principle of promotion by selection after fair competition should apply to their case as recommended for all other officers. As a further step, all masters who are qualified will enter the line or the various staff corps with the rank of lieutenant (junior grade), in the line of promotion. This is in addition to the opportunities now afforded by law.

10. This board is directed by the precept creating it not to consider increases in the total number of officers now provided by law and to recommend as small increase in cost as may be practicable. After consideration of practically the entire history of personnel proposals and legislation, the board believe that it has arrived at a most economical plan to accomplish the purpose, although efficiency has been the primary consideration.

11. Special attention is invited to the fact that any increase or decrease in the personnel which Congress may desire to make in the future can be effected without change in the general plan.

12. To sum up: The bill provides for proper distribution in grades, for uniform and fair promotion at proper ages, without material increase in cost. Detailed estimates of cost, etc., and a discussion of the bill by paragraphs will appear as an appendix to this report.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Senior Member.

VICTOR BLUE,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Member.

D. W. TAYLOR,

Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair, Member.

C. M. AUSTIN,

Lieutenant, United States Navy, Recorder.

APPENDIX III

THE PRICE OF UNPREPAREDNESS

The faulty military policy of the United States in refusing to keep a sufficiently large trained force of soldiers and upon the outbreak of war calling great numbers of untrained recruits to the colors, has been the cause of vast expenditures. Thousands of men have been enlisted in even our smallest wars to serve for only a short time. The consequence has been that a great many more men have been risked in a war than really were necessary. These untried and untrained masses have been sent out to do battle, and have been slaughtered on every battlefield. Trained troops will stand until one-third have been annihilated, but untrained troops will break and run sometimes at the first shot. This is the reason why great masses have been employed in our wars, and is the reason why the sum of our pensions has been so tremendous. The history of the sums expended by our government for pensions for each of our wars since 1790 spells a sad experience:

The Revolutionary War.....	\$70,000,000
The War of 1812.....	45,923,014
The Indian Wars.....	12,241,273
The War with Mexico.....	47,632,572
The Civil War.....	4,294,596,944
The War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection.	42,185,230
Regular established and sundries.....	44,960,800
	<hr/>
	\$4,557,539,833

In 1866 there were 126,722 pensioners. In 1897, just before the war with Spain, there were 993,714 names on the pension roll. After the war with Spain, in 1902, this number had increased to 999,446, and that number is still increasing, although fifty years have passed since the Civil War was over, and the veterans of that struggle are to-day dying at the rate of 35,000 a year.

It has cost the country, since 1866, \$125,871,965 simply to maintain the Bureau of Pensions through which the pensioners receive their money. This is the price we have already paid for non-preparation.



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